



Measuring the State of Muslim-West Relations: Assessing the “New Beginning”

November 28th 2010



مرکز غالوب أبو ظبي

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Foreword

Post 9/11, the continued threat of al Qaeda and global terrorist attacks, from Spain and Morocco to Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, made understanding who speaks for Islam and global Muslim opinion a critical strategic concern. The ensuing debate over the causes of and responses to the spread of global terrorism deeply engaged policy makers, academics, terrorism experts, and political commentators. While each had an opinion, missing in the debate were hard data on what the majority of Muslims thought. Toward this end, Gallup surveyed residents of societies with significant Muslim populations all over the world, covering 90% of the global faith community. We co-authored a book, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, which was released in 2008. This mammoth study spanned from 2001 to 2007, making it the most extensive and systematic study of Muslim opinions around the world. The results, which often countered conventional wisdom, shed light on issues such as what makes a radical, whether Muslims want democracy, whether Muslim women want equality, and the often asked why do Muslims hate us?

The reception and impact of *Who Speaks for Islam?* has been remarkable. Policy makers, scholars, religious leaders, the U.S. military, and the worldwide media have all drawn on its data, from President Barack Obama to the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa.

Not surprisingly, new global dynamics arising from developments in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and elsewhere have raised new questions. The election of U.S. President Barack Obama and the expectations raised in some quarters by his outreach to majority Muslim communities — seen in his Ankara address and even more so in his Cairo speech — signaled a new era in American foreign policy. To continue to inform the discourse on predominantly Muslim communities, Gallup has continued its global research. The Abu Dhabi Gallup Center will release the results of this groundbreaking work in a series of reports taking each chapter in *Who Speaks for Islam?* and exploring the research since its publication. We decided to begin at the end with the last chapter, *Clash or Cooperation?* This report builds upon, updates, and delves deeper into the complex perceptions regarding Muslim-West relations. We now examine issues such as the effect Obama's outreach has had in predominantly Muslim societies. Our work also explores who is now most ready for greater Muslim-West engagement, how Muslim and Western publics characterize the root cause of the existing tensions, and whether perceived Western respect for Islam and Muslims is indeed the key to improved relations.

The results of the new research deepen and refine the understanding we gained through our foundational work summarized in *Who Speaks for Islam?* We found that countries in the Middle East and North Africa region were more engaged in and aware of the issues of Muslim-West relations than communities in Asian and sub-Saharan African countries.

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) publics place the highest importance on Muslim-West relations, and have shown the greatest degree of change in attitudes since Obama took office. However, in 2010, Obama's approval rating decreased in several countries in this region. Building on our finding that showing respect for Islam was an important component of improving Muslim-West relations, we found that this meant not only Westerners refraining from desecrating religious symbols, but also demonstrating fairness in Western government policies. Adding a crucial layer to our primary finding that it was politics and not religious differences that roused Muslim anger toward the U.S., we discovered that those who viewed the root cause of Muslim-West tensions to be political were more likely to see the conflict as avoidable. Those who viewed it as religious were more likely to see it as unavoidable. However, we also found that religiosity in the Muslim community works to the advantage of engagement.

**Middle East and North Africa (MENA) publics place the highest
importance in Muslim-West relations, and have shown the greatest
degree of change in attitudes since Obama took office.**

The Abu Dhabi Gallup Center will continue to explore the complex and changing dynamics of Muslim-West relations, informing leaders and the public with the wisdom of the people.

We would like to recognize the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Court for its support and partnership. This report is also the fruit of the efforts of many individuals. In particular, we would like to thank the core team of Gallup analysts, including Dalia Mogahed, Magali Rheault, Mohamed Younis, Dr. Sofia Kluch, Eric Olesen, Ken Kluch, and Kyley Nemeckay for their tireless efforts in digging through the data to produce highly compelling sections. We are greatly indebted to Dr. Gale Muller, Dr. Robert Tortora, Richard Burkholder, Dr. Anita Pugliese, Lydia Saad, Lymari Morales, and Jihad Fakhreddine for their critical read of the report and the valuable feedback they provided. Dr. Rajesh Srinivasan, Christine Delmeiren, Neli Esipova, and Nicole Naurath were instrumental in the data collection process in several countries included in the report. We would like to thank Ben Klima and Jessica Stutzman for their outstanding work with the editing of the report and their insightful comments to improve the final draft. We also wish to acknowledge Molly Hardin and Samantha Allemang for their tremendous efforts with the layout and design of this report. Last, and certainly not least, we wish to recognize the outstanding work of Jeff Bechtolt to coordinate between the various teams to make this report a reality.

John L. Esposito
Dalia Mogahed



Executive Summary

Measuring the State of Muslim-West Relations: Assessing the “New Beginning” presents an in-depth analysis of Muslims’ and Westerners’ attitudes toward interactions between their societies. This report not only explores in greater detail key findings from *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, but also delves into new dimensions of the Muslim-West relationship. More specifically, the book underscored three main themes in Muslims’ perceptions of Muslim-West tensions: the salience of politics as opposed to religion, the importance of respect, and the role of conflicts in Muslim lands that involve Western powers. Since the book’s publication in March 2008, a new U.S. administration has explicitly committed to engaging with Muslims around the world in a positive and respectful manner.

Against this backdrop, *Assessing the New Beginning* looks at how Muslims’ and Westerners’ attitudes toward the Muslim-West relationship have changed over time, including how Muslims view the job performance of U.S. leadership. The report, which is based on survey research Gallup conducted between 2006 and early 2010, delves into the meaning of respect and the source of tensions between Western and majority Muslim societies. It also compares and contrasts individuals who express an interest in Muslim-West engagement and those who do not. Furthermore, the report summarizes public attitudes in three conflict areas: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories.

Drawing from the key findings, the report presents six policy recommendations that aim to inform the debate based on the many facets of Muslim-West relations in the U.S. and beyond.

Section 1: Change Over Time: Muslims’ Views of Muslim-West Relations

Compared with residents in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, those living in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region place the highest level of importance on Muslim-West relations. In 2009, 61% of MENA residents — compared with 52% of those living in Asia and 49% of those in sub-Saharan Africa — said the quality of the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is important to them. In addition, MENA residents are the most likely to believe majority Muslim communities are committed to improving interactions with Western societies. But when asked whether the West is committed to improving relations with majority Muslim societies, minorities of residents in these three regions believe the West is committed. However, majorities of Western residents also place great importance on the

quality of Muslim-West relations. Americans (78%) are the most likely of all Westerners surveyed to say the quality of Muslim-West relations is important to them.

Between 2008 and 2009, approval of U.S. leadership remained flat in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but it increased from 12% to 32% in MENA. However, findings from subsequent surveys reveal the momentum was not sustained in MENA. In fact, approval of U.S. leadership in several Arab countries decreased in early 2010. The drop was most pronounced in Egypt. In 2008, 6% of Egyptians said they approved of U.S. leadership while in early 2009, 25% said the same. Egyptians' approval reached 37%, just two months after President Obama's speech in Cairo, in August 2009. But in February 2010, Egyptians' approval of U.S. leadership dropped to 19%.

Section 2: Perceptions of Muslim-West Interactions as a Threat Versus a Benefit

In the vast majority of countries surveyed, individuals are more likely to say greater interaction between the two sides is a benefit rather than a threat. Across 48 countries where Gallup fielded the question, an average of 59% say it is a benefit, 21% say it is a threat, and 20% do not express an opinion. Furthermore, the results reveal that positive attitudes toward increased contact are not exclusive to either side. In the U.S., 76% of individuals say greater interaction is a benefit, 21% view it as a threat, and 3% say they do not know. In Iran, 63% of the public view greater contact as a benefit, 19% say it is a threat, and 18% say they do not know.

In terms of demographic characteristics, individuals between the ages of 15 and 29, men, and those with at least a high school degree are the most likely to view greater interaction as a benefit, regardless of whether they live in a majority Muslim society or Western country. An average of 62% of Muslims with at least a high school degree compared with 49% of those with an elementary education say greater contact is a benefit. The relationship between education and positive views on increased contact with the other side is even more pronounced in Western countries surveyed. Eighty-five percent of those with at least a high school degree compared with 54% of individuals with an elementary education say greater interaction with the other is a benefit.

Section 3: Exploring the Fault Lines – Politics, Culture, Religion

Europe and MENA residents are the most likely to view political differences as the cause of Muslim-West tensions – an average 40% in both regions. More specifically, individuals in Lebanon (74%), Iran (58%), Syria (53%), and the Palestinian Territories (52%) are among the most likely to cite politics as the source of Muslim-West tensions. At the same time, 40% of individuals in MENA believe such tensions stem from religious differences. Those who perceive political differences as the cause of such tensions are, in general, more likely to believe violent conflict between majority Muslim and Western societies can be avoided. This is particularly true in MENA (46%) and the U.S. and Canada (average: 40%), where residents believe conflict is avoidable (compared with 40% and 30%, respectively, who believe a conflict is unavoidable). By contrast, individuals who view tensions as grounded in religious differences are less hopeful about avoiding conflict. Among those who believe a conflict is inevitable, an average of 44% in the U.S. and Canada and 51% in MENA cite religious factors as the basis of tensions.

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Sub-Saharan African residents are, by far, the most likely to perceive religion as the main reason for Muslim-West tensions (48%). In the U.S. and Canada, residents are equally split over whether political (35%) or religious (36%) differences best explain tensions between predominantly Muslim and Western societies. While Asians are most likely to cite matters related to political differences (33%), they are also the most likely to not express an opinion on this issue. Across all regions, the perception that cultural differences are the cause of Muslim-West tensions is a minority view. Residents in the U.S. and Canada (26%) are the most likely to believe such tensions are based in culture.

Section 4: Engagement Readiness: Who is Looking for Improved Relations?

Across countries, individuals are classified as either “Ready” or “Not Ready” for Muslim-West engagement. This classification is based on individuals’ attitudes toward the importance of the quality of Muslim-West relations, commitment to improving relations, perceptions of being respected by the other side, perceptions of the outcome of having greater interaction, as well as perceptions of future conflict. Overall, Ready individuals perceive their own side (either Western or majority Muslim society) is committed to greater contact with the other. They are positive about greater interaction and believe conflict is avoidable. Not Ready individuals are doubtful of their communities’ commitment and respect for the other side. They also reject greater interaction and view a Muslim-West conflict as inevitable.

For Not Ready individuals, irrespective of whether they live in majority Muslim or Western societies, religion is the factor most likely to be cited as being at the root of Muslim-West tensions. Fifty-five percent of Not Ready individuals in majority Muslim societies and 46% of Not Ready individuals in Western societies say such tensions stem from religious differences. However, for individuals classified as Ready, the key factor is not religion but politics. Almost one-half of Ready Muslims (46%) and 39% of Ready Westerners believe tensions stem from political differences.

Ready individuals living in majority Muslim societies are more likely than those classified as Not Ready to report having attended a religious service in the past week. However, in Western societies, Ready individuals are less likely than those in the Not Ready group to report religious attendance. Additionally, Ready individuals in both majority Muslim and Western societies are more likely than Not Ready individuals to be optimistic about having a better life in the future.

Section 5: Muslims’ Voices on the Meaning of Respect

On one hand, Muslims (63%) believe predominantly Muslim communities respect the West, and on the other, fewer than 3 in 10 Muslims (28%) believe the West respects them. Interestingly, significant proportions of non-Muslims share this sentiment as 42% say they do not believe the West respects predominantly Muslim societies. Perceptions of disrespect are highest among residents of the MENA region (65%) and lowest among residents living in Europe (35%) and sub-Saharan Africa (37%). In the U.S., 53% of the American public say the West does not respect majority Muslim communities.

When asked what the West could do to improve relations with predominantly Muslim societies, Muslims say “respect Islam.” The most meaningful action to display respect revolves around religious symbols. Seventy-two percent of Muslims say abstaining from desecrating Islam’s holy book and Muslim religious symbols would be very meaningful to them. Muslims also report respect as being treated fairly in policies that affect them (54%) and portraying Muslim movie characters in an accurate manner (49%).

Section 6: Perceptions in Acute Conflicts

Afghans on the War in Afghanistan

Afghans’ top-of-mind concerns underscore economic issues. In October 2009, 21% cited bad local economy, 20% referred to unemployment, and 15% said high costs of goods are the single most important problem their families face today. Although poor personal economics is the thread linking most Afghans across the country, their attitudes on other issues vary greatly across regions. For example, when asked to assess the current security situation, 37% of Afghans overall say it has worsened compared to six months ago. However, in Nangarhar and Helmand, 79% and 59%, respectively, said the same. Perceptions of the influence of the government also reveal much regional variation: 79% of residents in Helmand and 54% in Herat say the central government does not have a great deal of influence in their communities. As a point of comparison, 41% of all Afghans say the same.

While many Afghans (46%) express dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working in their country, it does not translate into support for Taliban rule (5%). When asked about how to best rule Afghanistan, no form of government elicits majority views. About one-third of Afghans (31%) say they prefer having a strong leader who does not need to bother with parliament and elections and 22% say a group of experts should make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Yet more than one-quarter of Afghans (27%) say having a democratic political system is the best way to govern the country.

Iraqis on the War in Iraq

While Iraqis are more likely to view the coalition invasion of their country as having done more harm (44%) than good (27%), their opinions on the net effect of the invasion vary greatly depending on their ethnic and sectarian affiliation. Residents in predominantly Shia and Kurdish areas are more likely to believe the invasion did more good than harm, while those living in Sunni areas are more likely to view it as having done more harm than good. Iraqis, regardless of religious affiliation or province, said they preferred coalition forces to leave immediately (61%) or in the next few months (28%).

The role in which Iraqis appear to welcome the U.S. is that of a partner. In 2008, 67% of Iraqis said they believe the U.S. is serious about improving economic conditions in Iraq, up from 54% in 2004. Similarly, 63% expressed confidence the U.S. is serious about the establishment of democracy in their country (up from 51% in 2004) and 71% said they believe the U.S. would allow Iraq to fashion its own future without interference, up from 37% in 2004.

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Iraqis reported facing challenges toward meeting basic needs, but the trend shows some improvement. In 2008, 25% of Iraqis said there were times in the past year when they did not have enough money to buy food. In early 2010, 18% reported lacking money to buy food. Over the same time period, Iraqis' perceptions that economic conditions in the country were either "good" or "excellent" increased from 23% to 39%. Iraqis were also slightly more likely to report it was a good time to find a job in early 2010 (33%) compared to 28% who said the same in 2008.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Through the Eyes of Those Who Live It

In the late summer and early fall of 2008, majorities of Israelis and Palestinians expressed some level of support for the peace process. Non-Jewish/secular Israelis (57%) were, by far, the most likely group to say they *strongly* support it compared with 13% of Israeli Jews. Among Palestinians, 35% expressed *strong* support for the peace process. However, the perceived prospects for an enduring peace between Israelis and Palestinians looked dim as 66% of Israeli Jews and 75% of Palestinians did not believe a permanent peace would ever be achieved. Non-Jewish/secular Israelis appeared less gloomy about the conflict, with 45% doubtful about achieving peace.

When asked about the means to reach self-determination and security for their respective populations, Palestinians were more likely to say non-violent means (53%) than armed struggle (30%). But Israeli Jews were almost equally divided between non-violence (44%) and armed struggle (40%). Pacifist attitudes were most prevalent among non-Jewish/secular Israelis as 61% said they believe mostly in non-violent means to achieve self-determination and security.

In 2008, with Ehud Olmert as Israel's Prime Minister, similar levels of Israeli Jews (36%) and non-Jewish/secular Israelis (38%) approved of the job performance of their country's leadership. By the fall of 2009, with Binyamin Netanyahu serving as Prime Minister, perceptions of Israel's leadership between the two groups of Israelis diverged: 52% of Israeli Jews said they approved of their country's leadership while approval among non-Jewish/secular Israelis dipped to 25%. In 2008, Palestinians in the West Bank (45%) were more likely than those in Gaza (34%) to say they approved of the job performance of their own leadership. In September 2009, Palestinians' opinions of their leadership were virtually unchanged (43% in the West Bank and 38% in Gaza). In early 2010, however, public approval of the leadership in the West Bank increased to 57%, while approval of the leadership in Gaza remained flat (39%).

Section 7: Recommendations

Some of the recommendations are more relevant for government officials and decision makers. Others, such as NGOs and community organizations, can benefit by framing their projects and programs in a manner that is most receptive to people's perceptions in Western and majority Muslim societies.

1. When engaging Muslims globally, focus the most effort in the area of greatest need and receptivity, the MENA region.
2. Leadership in both Western societies as well as majority Muslim ones should more effectively communicate on-the-ground initiatives within majority Muslim societies and the West. Such efforts should emphasize areas of partnership that go beyond security concerns, such as science, technology, and entrepreneurship.
3. Policy initiatives should continue to emphasize mutual respect and mutual interests by discussing the *fairness* of decisions and actions, in addition to continuing to use culturally appropriate narratives.
4. In engaging diplomatically and building efforts for collaboration, majority Muslim and Western society leaders must emphasize resolving *political* issues rather than religious conflict.
5. In Afghanistan, the central government should focus its efforts on projects/initiatives that speak to the one thing that all Afghans share — financial and economic development concerns.
6. In Iraq, as the U.S. proceeds to a complete withdrawal of military forces, such actions should be followed up with a humanitarian surge, organized in cooperation with the Iraqi government. This will help rebuild Iraq with partners from the international community.

Technical Note

Findings in this report were based on data collected between 2006 and 2010 across 55 countries or areas. Gallup conducted interviews with 123,288 people aged 15 and older in face-to-face and telephone interviews. For more information about the methodology, please go to page 78.

The findings represent the opinions of the vast majority of Muslims around the world with extensive coverage of Asia, the Former Soviet Union, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). To examine Muslim-West relations in depth, we analyzed the findings through three distinct lenses. First, the data were aggregated into majority Muslim and Western societies for a global perspective about the state of the relationship. Second, the data were aggregated into major world regions to examine any variations. Third, the data from individual countries were analyzed as they pertain to attitudes toward conflicts, military action, and populations' basic needs.

Each country was classified as either a majority Muslim or Western society based on the proportions of individuals who identify their religious affiliation as "Muslim" or "Islam." While Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Ivory Coast do not have a majority of people who say they are Muslim, these two countries were classified as majority Muslim societies due to their relatively high proportion of Muslims. In the report, Gallup interviewed 101,582 respondents in majority Muslim societies and 18,173 respondents from Western societies.

Because of ongoing conflict in Somalia, Gallup could field the questionnaire only in the Northwest region of the country, known as Somaliland. In 1991, the region declared its independence after civil order collapsed in Somalia, but the international community does not recognize Somaliland as a sovereign nation. For ease of use, this report uses the term "Somaliland Region" to identify the region of Somalia where the fieldwork could take place. However, such a reference is not an indication of any position taken by Gallup on the political status of Somaliland.

Table 1: Majority Muslim and Western Society Categorization

Majority Muslim Societies			Western Societies
Afghanistan	Ivory Coast	Palestinian Territories	Belgium
Albania	Jordan	Qatar	Canada
Algeria	Kazakhstan	Saudi Arabia	France
Azerbaijan	Kosovo	Senegal	Germany
Bahrain	Kuwait	Sierra Leone	Italy
Bangladesh	Kyrgyzstan	Somaliland Region	Netherlands
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lebanon	Sudan	Norway
Burkina Faso	Libya	Syria	United Kingdom
Chad	Malaysia	Tajikistan	United States
Comoros	Mali	Tunisia	
Djibouti	Mauritania	Turkey	
Egypt	Morocco	Turkmenistan	
Indonesia	Niger	United Arab Emirates	
Iran	Nigeria	Uzbekistan	
Iraq	Pakistan	Yemen	

In multiple sections of the report, the regional depiction of majority Muslim countries was used to further examine the diversity of those societies. When these regions were trended in Section 1, they included only countries with consistent trend lines. Due to trending, the number of countries included is less than the number of total countries in the report. For Section 1, the following table illustrates the trended regional categories. This section includes interviews with 36,016 respondents in the MENA region, 11,000 respondents in sub-Saharan Africa, 14,204 respondents in Asia, 2,003 respondents in FSU/Balkans, 13,042 respondents in Europe, and 4,023 respondents in the U.S. and Canada.

Table 2: Trended Regional Categorization

MENA		Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia	FSU/Balkans	Europe	U.S. and Canada
Algeria	Mauritania	Djibouti	Afghanistan	Turkey	Belgium	Canada
Egypt	Palestinian Territories	Mali	Bangladesh		France	United States
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	Niger	Indonesia		Germany	
Jordan	Syria	Nigeria	Malaysia		Italy	
Lebanon	Tunisia	Senegal	Pakistan		Netherlands	
					Norway	
					United Kingdom	

For Sections 2 and 4, more countries were included in each region as they did not need to cover multiple waves of data. For these sections, regional data refers to the list of countries in Table 3. This section includes interviews with 47,278 respondents in the MENA region, 19,000 respondents in sub-Saharan Africa, 11,124 respondents in Asia, 16,079 respondents in FSU/Balkans, 14,050 respondents in Europe, and 4,023 respondents in the U.S. and Canada.

Table 3: General Regional Categories

MENA		Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia	FSU/ Balkans	Europe	U.S. and Canada
Algeria	Palestinian Territories	Burkina Faso	Afghanistan	Albania	Belgium	Canada
Bahrain	Qatar	Chad	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan	France	United States
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Comoros	Indonesia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Germany	
Iran	Sudan	Djibouti	Malaysia	Kazakhstan	Italy	
Iraq	Syria	Ivory Coast	Pakistan	Kosovo	Netherlands	
Jordan	Tunisia	Mali		Kyrgyzstan	Norway	
Kuwait	United Arab Emirates	Niger		Tajikistan	United Kingdom	
Lebanon	Yemen	Nigeria		Turkey		
Libya		Senegal		Turkmenistan		
Mauritania		Sierra Leone		Uzbekistan		
Morocco		Somaliland Region				



Section 1 - Change Over Time: Muslims' Views of Muslim-West Relations

Overall, the largest improvement in sentiments over the period from 2008 to 2009 is in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This region had some of the lowest approval numbers of U.S. leadership at the end of the Bush administration. However, it has been the fastest to improve following Barack Obama's election, possibly in response to his new prospective approach to U.S.-Muslim engagement. Moreover, respondents in this region were the most likely to say relations between Muslims and the West are important, which suggests greater engagement, and therefore awareness, of changes in tone and language on the part of global leaders. However, in early 2010, public approval of U.S. leadership declined in several Middle Eastern countries, including in Egypt.

Obama and Majority Muslim Societies

President Obama identified improving U.S. relations with “the Muslim world” as a key foreign policy imperative during his presidential campaign. For the first time in U.S. history, the president addressed Muslims directly during his inaugural address when he said, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” This statement set off a series of overtures toward majority Muslim societies aimed at positive engagement with local populations.

Fulfilling a campaign promise, Obama gave a historic speech to Muslims around the world from Cairo in June 2009. Several initiatives, led by the White House, are underway across government to move this agenda item forward. These include programs promoting entrepreneurship, student and scholarly exchanges, partnerships to eradicate disease, as well as programs to increase women's education in majority Muslim societies.

However, some critics have charged that the new administration has only made cosmetic rhetorical changes, and that the core policies defining anti-American sentiment in predominantly Muslim societies remain constant. These skeptics, especially those in the Arab world, assert that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Guantanamo Bay prison, close ties to unpopular regimes, as well as America's position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not changed since the Bush administration.

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The most important question, however, is how do ordinary people around the world feel about the administration's efforts? Has the president's diplomatic outreach changed global views of the U.S. and the West, or are the larger policy issues overshadowing these overtures?

Measuring the State of the Relationship Between Majority Muslim and Western Societies

To gauge the state of the relationship between majority Muslim and Western societies, Gallup created a set of nine questions measuring three levels in a hierarchy of interaction between two parties. The most basic level is simply Conflict Avoidance. In this category, Gallup posed questions on perceptions of whether predominantly Muslim and Western societies are getting along well, on whether the interaction is improving, and on whether conflict between the two societies can be avoided. The second broad dimension in the hierarchy is referred to as Coexistence. In this category, Gallup researchers probed respondents' perceptions of the importance of the relationship, how committed they feel each side is, and how respectful each side is to the other. This dimension measures the components necessary to go beyond avoiding conflict, to peacefully coexisting. The highest level of the hierarchy measures respondents' perceptions of the relative benefit or harm of greater engagement. This dimension is referred to as Cooperation. It includes only one question on whether greater interaction between Western and majority Muslim societies is more of a benefit or a threat.


Conflict Avoidance

Though most adults in the regions surveyed believed that majority Muslim and Western societies can avoid conflict, most did not believe conflict is being avoided currently. MENA, a region with relatively pessimistic views of the relationship in 2008, was also the region with the greatest degree of improvement in perceptions between 2008 and 2009.

Majority Muslim countries in the Asia and MENA regions saw a slight increase between 2008 and 2009 in the percentage who said they believed conflict between the West and majority Muslim societ-

Figure 4: Perceptions the Muslim-West Conflict Is Avoidable on the Rise in Asia

Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided or not? - % Yes



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ies is avoidable. Though majorities in countries with significant Muslim populations in sub-Saharan Africa believed conflict is avoidable, the percentage went down slightly between 2008 and 2009. However, this seven-percentage-point decrease in 2009 did not align with those who said conflict is unavoidable, but rather with those who said they did not know. In MENA, a larger percentage believed conflict is avoidable than those who believed conflict is unavoidable, but with a sizable minority saying they did not know.

Though more believed conflict between Western and majority Muslim communities can be avoided than those who said it is inevitable, only a minority believed the two sides are getting along well today. The MENA region was among the least likely to view the relationship positively in 2008, but it leads in the degree of improvement in this view over the past two years. In the Asia region, there was little change over the past two years, with sub-Saharan Africa seeing a slight dip — again with the difference now saying they did not know.

Most do not believe interactions between majority Muslim and Western societies are getting better, though, again, the largest jump in this view was in the MENA region. Like assessments of the state of the

Figure 5: Greatest Improvement in Perceptions of Muslim-West Relations in MENA

Do you think the Muslim world and the Western world are getting along well with each other today? - % Yes





Figure 6: MENA Respondents More Optimistic in 2009

Do you think the interaction between the Muslim world and the Western world is getting better or getting worse? - % Who say getting better



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relationship, the other regions either stayed the same or saw a slight drop in respondents' perceptions that interactions are improving because in 2009 more people were unsure.

Coexistence

The state of the relationship between predominantly Muslim and Western societies remains important to most residents in the Asia and MENA regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, those concerned about the relationship decreased over this period with most of the change going to the group who say they are unsure. The MENA region led the other two regions in the value it placed on the state of Muslim-West relations.

Respondents' perceptions of their own personal concern about Muslim-West relations in the Asia and MENA regions closely paralleled their assessment of the commitment of the "Muslim world" as a whole. In contrast, residents of sub-Saharan African countries with significant Muslim populations reported less optimism about the commitment of majority Muslim communities than the importance they assigned to the relationship.

Figure 7: Quality of Muslim-West Relationship Most Important in MENA

Is the quality of interaction between the Muslim and the Western worlds important to you? - % Yes





Figure 8: MENA Respondents Most Likely to Believe Muslim World Is Committed

Do you think the Muslim world is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds? - % Yes



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While the state of Muslim-West relations was important to many Muslims, most did not believe the West shared this concern. This view remained largely unchanged from 2008 to 2009, with only a slight improvement in the MENA region. However, the actual views of respondents in Western countries painted a different picture. In 2008, majorities across Europe and North America, most notably in the U.S., said that the relationship between the two sides was important.

Figure 9: Africans Most Likely to Believe the West Is Committed to Better Relations

Do you think the Western world is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds? - % Yes





Figure 10: Majority in Western Countries Say Better Relations Important

Is the quality of interaction between the Muslim and the Western worlds important to you? - % Yes




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Those who said they believe predominantly Muslim communities respect the West stayed constant between 2008 and 2009 in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, this perception increased (64% to 71%) in MENA, the region least likely to believe the West reciprocated this respect.

Figure 11: Perceptions Muslim World Respects the West Are Steady


Do you believe that the Muslim world respects the Western world? - % Yes



Just as most in majority Muslim countries believed the West did not show concern for better relations, most also believed the West did not respect majority Muslim societies. This was especially the case among MENA residents in 2008, in which only 17% believed the West respects the Muslim world. However, this number was up slightly in 2009 when roughly one-quarter said they believed the West respects majority Muslim communities.

Figure 12: Perceptions the West Respects the Muslim World Low But Rising in MENA


Do you believe that the Western world respects the Muslim world? - % Yes



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Despite the common perception that the West did not respect or care about improving relations with Muslims, a higher percentage in all three regions believed that greater interaction between Western and predominantly Muslim communities is a benefit rather than a threat. The percentage who expressed this view has remained constant in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but it has increased in MENA.

Figure 13: More Believe Greater Interaction Is a Benefit
Which comes closer to your point of view? Greater interaction between Muslim and Western worlds is a threat or greater interaction between Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit? - % Benefit




Greatest Improvement in Approval of U.S. Leadership in MENA

Reflecting the overall results observed in views of Muslim-West relations, approval of U.S. leadership remained flat in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa between 2008 and 2009, but went up significantly in MENA. It is important to note that approval ratings of U.S. leadership in sub-Saharan Africa were and remain among the highest in the world.

However, the increase in approval of U.S. leadership in the Middle East in 2009 was short lived. The most

Figure 14: MENA Approval of U.S. Leadership Up in 2009
Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the following countries? The U.S.A. - % Approve




SECTION 1 - CHANGE OVER TIME: MUSLIMS' VIEWS OF MUSLIM-WEST RELATIONS

recent data from early 2010 show a dip in approval in several nations in the MENA region, including the most populous Arab country — Egypt.

Egyptians' approval of U.S. leadership was among the lowest in the world at only 6% in 2008. This number increased to 25% in the first half of 2009 after Obama took office. Figure 15 shows Egyptians' approval in August of 2009, at 37%. However, in February of 2010, approval decreased to 19%. Data taken from a national poll of Egypt shortly after Obama's June 4 Cairo address suggests that Egyptians' perceptions of America's involvement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may help explain the dip. According to a national poll¹ of Egypt conducted in June 2009, the top response offered as to the most important topic covered in the Cairo speech was the "Palestinian issue and Arab-Israeli relations," mentioned by nearly half (48%) of all respondents. "Relations between the USA and Muslims" followed this in frequency, mentioned by 22% of respondents — less than half as many as those who mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Figure 15: Approval of U.S. Leadership Down in 2010

Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the following countries? The U.S.A. - % Approve



1 The Egyptian Cabinet—Information & Decision Support Center, June 2009.

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However, majority Muslim countries in Asia showed a different directional change. In contrast to MENA, in both Indonesia and Afghanistan, approval numbers of U.S. leadership actually went down in 2009 versus 2008 and remained largely unchanged in 2010. Although, taking a closer look reveals two different stories as to the reasons. In Indonesia, this change in attitudes between the Bush and Obama administrations reflected not an increase in disapproval, but rather an uptick in those who said they did not know. The portion who disapproved of U.S. leadership actually went down in Indonesia between 2008 (30%) and 2009 (23%), whereas those who said they were unsure increased from 24% in 2008 to 41% in 2009 to 48% in 2010. This suggests that residents of the most populous majority Muslim country, and the one in which Obama spent part of his childhood, are still unsure about the new administration.


The slight dip in Afghans' approval of U.S. leadership in 2009 vs. 2008 also reflected a slight increase in residents who said they were unsure — not those who disapproved. However, in 2010, while the percentage who approved decreased by one percentage point, the percentage who said they disapproved increased by nine percentage points (45% in 2009 vs. 54% in 2010) with fewer people saying they did not know. Such findings possibly reflect Afghans' souring attitudes toward their local conditions and coalition forces (go to page 56 to read about Afghans' opinions).

In Bangladesh however, approval of American leadership went up slightly in 2009 compared to the previous year, and remained roughly the same in 2010.

Residents of majority Muslim countries in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and MENA remain skeptical about Western respect and concern for better relations with Muslims, though many continued to say the relationship concerns them. While those living in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa were generally more positive about the relationship than Middle Easterners, they also assigned the relationship less importance than those in MENA. The importance MENA residents placed on the quality of the relationship between Western and majority Muslim societies may partially explain why they showed the greatest change in attitudes regarding this relationship. Greater concern for better relations may account for a quicker response to overtures of goodwill and quicker disappointment with a lack of results.

Figure 16: Approval of U.S. Leadership in Asia

Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of the following countries? U.S.A. - % Approve







Section 2 - Perceptions of Muslim-West Interactions as a Threat Versus a Benefit

For most individuals, regardless of whether they live in a Western or majority Muslim country, greater interaction with the “other” is more of a benefit than a threat. Across the 48 countries surveyed, 59% said increased contact with the “other” is a benefit, 21% said it is a threat, and 20% said they did not know.

Positive attitudes toward greater interaction are associated with higher education levels. Individuals with at least a high school degree were more likely than those with lower levels of education to view increased contact with the “other” as a benefit rather than a threat.

Residents in sub-Saharan African countries were among the ones who expressed the most positive views toward greater interaction while residents living in countries that are experiencing or have experienced conflict/severe unrest were more likely to view such increased contact as a threat.

In his book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington argued “the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived threat to the other.” To shed light on this theory, in 2009 Gallup asked nationally representative samples of individuals living in predominantly Muslim and Western countries if greater interaction between majority Muslim and Western societies was more a benefit or a threat. In the vast majority of countries surveyed, respondents were more likely to say greater interaction between the two societies is more of a benefit than a threat. Such findings do not appear to support the clash of civilizations theory, where populations on both sides would fear the other. Furthermore, the data revealed that positive attitudes toward increased contact were not exclusive to either society.

Across 48 countries where Gallup fielded the question, 59% said greater interaction is a benefit, 21% said it is a threat, and 20% said they did not know. In terms of demographic characteristics, young respondents (those between the ages of 15 and 29), men, and those with at least a high school degree were the most likely to view greater interaction as a benefit. This was true regardless of whether respondents lived in a majority Muslim or Western country.

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For example, 62% of residents in majority Muslim countries with at least a high school degree compared with 49% of those with an elementary education said greater interaction with the West is a benefit. The relationship between education and positive views on increased contact with the “other” was more pronounced in Western countries surveyed. Eighty-five percent of respondents living in Western countries with at least a high school degree compared with 54% who have an elementary education said greater interaction with majority Muslim communities is a benefit.

In light of how the media portrays reactions to news developments in certain countries, one might expect to see respondents in Iran, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and France to consider increased contact with the “other” as a threat. The poll findings revealed that the opposite was true — 63%, 65%, 76%, and 65%, respectively, said greater interaction is a benefit.

While a variety of reasons may explain why populations across such a broad swath of geopolitical, religious, and cultural environments perceived this interaction positively, it is important to point out that people were far more likely to view increased contact as a benefit, and not a threat. The difference between the proportion of individuals who said greater interaction is a benefit and those who said it is a threat, suggests that most people (except for a few countries) would welcome more interaction and exchanges between predominantly Muslim and Western societies.

At the top of the list is Mali, where the difference between the proportion of individuals who said greater interaction is a benefit and those who said it is a threat is 77 percentage points. In the U.S. and Iran, the difference is 55 percentage points and 44 percentage points, respectively. At the other end of the list, the “benefit-threat” difference in Pakistan, Algeria, and Djibouti falls below double digits. In Afghanistan, it is negative as more Afghans considered greater interaction with Western countries to be a threat (46%) rather than a benefit (33%).

The full list of countries (ranked in decreasing order of respondents who said “it would be a benefit”) is available on page 32.

The Asset

The “Asset” list includes countries where respondents indicating greater contact is a benefit are highest. The countries that make up the top 10 Asset list cross the entire economic spectrum — it includes several of the world’s lowest-income economies, such as Niger and Mali, as well as several of the highest-income countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Norway.

Malians and Ivoirians were the most likely, of all respondents surveyed, to say greater interaction with the “other” is a benefit — 86% and 84%, respectively. Of note, three other sub-Saharan African countries — Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Niger — top the Asset list. Gallup’s research also showed that, in general, large majorities of sub-Saharan Africans approved of the leadership performance of several Western countries, including the U.S. As a result, the strong representation of sub-Saharan African countries in the Asset category is hardly surprising as those populations may view greater contact with Western countries as a means of boosting their economic development.

SECTION 2 - PERCEPTIONS OF MUSLIM-WEST INTERACTIONS AS A THREAT VERSUS A BENEFIT


Perhaps more surprisingly, in the top 10 Asset list were several Western countries including the U.S., Germany, Norway, and Canada. In each one of these countries, about three-quarters of the public said greater interaction with majority Muslim communities is a benefit. On the one hand, the U.S. has been spearheading military operations in two predominantly Muslim countries and has pursued a policy of democracy promotion in the MENA region for many years. On the other hand, the U.S. has also taken the lead on positive engagement with majority Muslim countries around the world, albeit a more recent development, as an effort that goes beyond counterterrorism efforts.

Against this backdrop, it is relevant to assess Americans' perceptions with regard to having greater contact with predominantly Muslim communities. Other Gallup poll findings have shown that Americans believe Muslims' negative attitudes toward the U.S. stem from misinformation (spread by Muslim media outlets and governments) rather than U.S. policies. Overall, the findings suggest Americans would welcome the opportunity to have more interaction with Muslims around the world as a way to paint a more accurate picture of American society. In other words, Americans appeared eager to correct what they see as Muslims' misperceptions of the U.S. Interestingly, when Gallup asked Muslims what they can do to improve relations with Western societies, one of the most frequent responses was to "improve the presentation of Islam."

Figure 17: Top 10 Asset List – Greater Interaction Is Perceived as a Benefit

Which comes closer to your point of view? Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat.

Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit.



The Challenge

The "Challenge" list includes countries where perceptions that greater interaction is a threat were highest. In the 48 countries surveyed, it is important to note that views that greater contact with the "other" is a benefit elicited a majority opinion. In two countries, however, attitudes were divided. The poll findings showed about half of Djiboutians and Algerians said greater interaction with the "other" is a benefit and about half in each country said it is a threat. The


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common threads linking countries in the top 10 Challenge list revolve around internal conflict (either ongoing or recent) and a large, Western military presence. In some cases, both conditions exist today as is the case in Afghanistan and Chad. In light of the NATO-led multi-country force (known as the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF) currently engaged in Afghanistan — the bulk of the troops come from Western nations — it is important to take note of what Afghans said about having greater interaction with the “other.” Afghanistan was the only country out of the 48 surveyed where more people thought such increased contact is a threat (46%) rather than a benefit (33%). Another 21% of Afghans did not express an opinion on the issue. As a result, the difference between the proportion of Afghans who said greater interaction with the Western world is a benefit and those who said it is a threat was negative, -13 percentage points.

Other findings may help explain such attitudes. First, Gallup’s research showed Afghans were far more likely to hold negative than positive opinions of two key Western countries — the U.S. and United Kingdom. In addition, there has been a sharp decline since 2008 in Afghans’ perceptions that the NATO-led force is effective in providing security in their communities. Such views decreased from 55% in December 2008 to 31% in October 2009. Based on the current situation in Afghanistan, where many have to endure the severe human, economic, and political consequences of the conflict, the findings suggest Afghans viewed increased contact with Western countries to be increasingly challenging. To learn more about Afghans’ attitudes toward the current dynamic in their country, go to page 56.

Figure 18: Top 10 Challenge List — Greater Interaction Is Perceived to Be a Threat

*Which comes closer to your point of view? Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat.
Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit.*



Public attitudes toward increased interaction between majority Muslim and Western societies point to a positive outcome as individuals emphasize its benefit rather than its threat. This suggests that many, at least in the countries surveyed, would be open to having more contact across drastically different societies. The findings further underscore the importance of education, regardless of where people live, in viewing greater interaction positively.

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Figure 19: Attitudes Toward Greater Interaction With the “Other Side”
(in decreasing order of perception that it is a benefit)

Which comes closer to your point of view? Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat. Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit.

	Benefit	Threat	Don't Know/ Refused	Benefit-Threat Difference
Mali	86%	9%	5%	77 points
Ivory Coast	84	14	2	70
Azerbaijan	80	6	14	74
Burkina Faso	78	14	8	64
Norway	76	12	12	64
Germany	76	13	11	63
Senegal	76	20	4	56
United States	76	21	3	55
Canada	73	20	7	53
Niger	73	24	3	49
Tunisia	72	13	15	59
Egypt	72	15	13	57
United Kingdom	72	20	8	52
Lebanon	70	24	6	46
Morocco	69	17	14	52
Netherlands	67	26	7	41
Sierra Leone	67	27	6	40
Mauritania	67	30	3	37
Comoros	67	32	1	35
Jordan	66	25	9	41
Malaysia	65	9	26	56
France	65	18	17	47
Bahrain	65	20	15	45
Saudi Arabia	65	22	13	43
Somaliland Region	65	34	1	31
Iran	63	19	18	44

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	Benefit	Threat	Don't Know/ Refused	Benefit-Threat Difference
Kuwait	61	27	12	34
Italy	59	14	27	45
Turkey	59	22	19	37
United Arab Emirates	58	22	20	36
Iraq	56	18	26	38
Palestinian Territories	56	32	12	24
Syria	55	11	34	44
Israel	55	33	12	22
Belgium	54	26	20	28
Chad	54	44	2	10
Yemen	53	31	16	22
Djibouti	51	48	1	3
Libya	50	21	29	29
Algeria	50	47	3	3
Bangladesh	45	16	39	29
Tajikistan	45	18	37	27
Kyrgyzstan	45	24	31	21
Indonesia	44	25	31	19
Nigeria	42	18	40	24
Kazakhstan	41	7	52	34
Pakistan	39	32	29	7
Afghanistan	33	46	21	-13
WEIGHTED AVERAGE	59%	21%	20%	38 points

Note: The question as to whether greater interaction is a threat or a benefit was not asked in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Qatar, Sudan, and Turkmenistan.



Section 3 - Exploring the Fault Lines: Politics, Culture, Religion

In this section, Gallup data shed light on what different regions and countries throughout the world view as the main causes of tension between majority Muslim societies and Western ones. The data highlight noticeable differences from region to region on whether societies perceive religious differences, cultural differences, or conflicts about political interests as the cause of such tensions.

While most of what is written about Muslim-West tensions tends to stress the symptoms, namely acts of violence committed by non-state actors or military operations in areas of acute conflicts, less focus is placed on exploring the underlying causes of such tensions. Gallup's multi-year research initiative in more than 35 predominantly Muslim countries revealed three major areas of concern cited by Muslim respondents: acute conflicts, perceived Western political domination of predominantly Muslim societies, and religious disrespect². To explore this issue further, Gallup asked respondents throughout Western and majority Muslim societies about the perceived cause of such tensions. Namely, whether they attributed Muslim-West tensions mostly to religious or cultural differences, or whether they thought the tensions were the result of conflicting political interests. If societies view the cause of the tensions as stemming from religious or cultural differences, they are less likely to be receptive to Muslim-West engagement (as explored elsewhere in this report), which sets a much higher hurdle for improving relations.

To explore this issue thoroughly, various questions must be answered. Among them: to what degree do people in the West and across majority Muslim societies view a Muslim-West conflict as inevitable? Some writers have argued that a Muslim-West conflict is not only "nothing new," but inescapable³. Yet when Gallup asked respondents around the world whether conflict between predominantly Muslim communities and the West can be avoided, majorities in both Western and majority Muslim countries thought such conflict is avoidable.

2 *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (Gallup 2008)

3 See generally, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, 1996.

SECTION 3 - EXPLORING THE FAULT LINES: POLITICS, CULTURE, RELIGION

However, when asked whether the cause of such conflict is due more to political, cultural, or religious differences, responses varied greatly from region to region and country to country.

For example, while 59% of respondents across 12 sub-Saharan African nations viewed such conflict as avoidable, they were among the most likely (when compared with respondents across all other regions) to view religious differences as the source of Muslim-West tensions. Interestingly, respondents in the U.S. and Canada were the most likely to say conflict could not be avoided, but they seemed equally divided on whether religious differences (36%) or political interests (35%) were at the heart of the conflict. About one-quarter of respondents from the U.S. and Canada combined cited cultural differences as the root cause of conflict. Furthermore, respondents from the U.S. and Canada regional cluster were the most likely of all regions surveyed to cite cultural differences to explain Muslim-West tensions.

Some trends arose regarding the inevitability of the conflict, particularly within regions among those who viewed the conflict as mostly attributable to cultural, religious, or political interests. Figure 22 displays only respondents

Figure 20: Majorities Believe Conflict Can Be Avoided

Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided, or not?





Figure 21: Significant Differences Across Regions in Defining the Root Cause of Muslim-West Tensions

Thinking about the tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds — do you think they arise more from differences of religion or differences of culture or from conflicts about political interests?



SECTION 3 - EXPLORING THE FAULT LINES: POLITICS, CULTURE, RELIGION

who viewed tensions as primarily due to conflicts in political interests. In two regions, respondents with this perception were more likely to say that the conflict between majority Muslim and Western societies was avoidable. In the U.S. and Canada combined, 40% of respondents who viewed Muslim-West tensions as political in nature were significantly more likely to view the conflict as avoidable. In the MENA region, a plurality (46%) of respondents who viewed tensions as political said it was avoidable, while 40% who defined the conflict similarly said it was not avoidable.

Those who view the root of Muslim-West tensions as primarily arising from religious differences were far more likely, across the five regions studied, to view conflict between majority Muslim and Western societies as unavoidable. This trend was most noticeable in the U.S. and Canada regional cluster and the MENA region, where 44% and 51%, respectively, of those who said the conflict cannot be avoided cited religious reasons as the basis of such tensions. This trend was also true among Asian and European countries surveyed as 39% and 38%, respectively, of those citing religious differences as the primary cause of tensions perceived Muslim-West conflicts as unavoidable. Twenty-

Figure 22: Those who say conflict is avoidable more likely to identify **politics** as reason for tensions

Thinking about the tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds — do you think they arise more from differences of religion or differences of culture or from conflicts about political interests?

Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided, or not?





Figure 23: Those who say conflict is unavoidable more likely to identify **religion** as reason for tensions

Thinking about the tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds — do you think they arise more from differences of religion or differences of culture or from conflicts about political interests?

Do you think violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided, or not?



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nine percent and 28%, respectively, of those who shared the same view on the cause of tensions said such conflicts could be avoided.

However, categorical definitions such as “religion,” “culture,” or “political interests” can take on different meanings from society to society. This is particularly the case when people in some societies have limited or selective knowledge of the other society in question. For example, Gallup’s latest research on Americans’ opinions of Muslims and Islam revealed that 63% of the American public described its knowledge of Islam as “very little” or “none at all.”⁴

This confusion in understanding and defining other societies’ behaviors, and their respective motivations, also exists in predominantly Muslim communities. For example, many in such communities view the war on terror as a war on Islam. Former President George W. Bush’s description of the war on terror in September 2001 as a crusade only exacerbated this sentiment. Polling in the region highlights the degree to which respondents in some of the most populous majority Muslim countries believed the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy to be “trying to weaken and divide Islam” and “spread Christianity to the Middle East.”⁵ Even though political discourse in the U.S. nearly always frames the war on terror as an effort to protect Americans from attacks such as those on 9/11, many in majority Muslim societies view U.S. foreign policies as religiously motivated.

Thus, one society can view the issue as religious in nature, and another society can view it as political. The following is an examination and comparison of how respondents around the world define the underlying causes of Muslim-West tensions. The analysis focuses more fully on the perceptions of respondents who cited differences in political interests and religious beliefs as the root of Muslim-West tension. It then briefly explores the opinions of those who cited cultural differences. The focus was placed on those citing political and religious beliefs because their views were often more definitively placed on the scale of evaluating Muslim-West relations. Namely, those citing religion were the least hopeful and those citing politics the most optimistic about the chances of improving Muslim-West relations. The opinions of these groups are more informative to policy makers and thinkers in making an impact through their work on Muslim-West relations. However, it is still important to examine the perceptions of those who said cultural differences are the root of tensions as well as how this group’s perceptions differed from the rest.

Political Interests

Forty percent of respondents across 19 MENA countries told Gallup that Muslim-West tensions arise more from conflicts about political interests than religious or cultural differences. In this region, the focus was on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Palestinians’ struggles in Gaza. Increasingly, a strong focus on the Iraq war and a sense of urgency in calling for complete U.S. withdrawal is another unique aspect of sentiment in the MENA region. High percentages of respondents across the MENA region also said that the U.S. will not allow people in that region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influence. These specific issues, as well as a general focus on acute conflicts, play a role in shaping respondents’ perceptions of the root cause of Muslim-West tensions.

4 Religious Perceptions in America, pg. 9. Available at: <http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/125315/Religious-Perceptions-America.aspx>

5 See: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf Where a majority of Egyptians, Pakistanis, Indonesians, and Moroccans all held this view.

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It is important to note that despite the obvious religious connotations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from the Arab perspective, dating back to the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the conflict is often framed in a political, not religious context. According to Gallup data, 52% of Palestinians cited conflicts in political interests as the primary cause of Muslim-West tensions.

Interestingly, respondents across Europe were as likely as MENA respondents to cite political interests as the root cause of Muslim-West tensions. Forty percent of European respondents across seven European nations told Gallup that tensions between majority Muslim and Western societies arise more from political conflicts than religious or cultural differences.

European perceptions on political interests and their role in fueling Muslim-West tensions represent a stark contrast from the outlook of many of these same nations when dealing with socioeconomic challenges that their own domestic Muslim populations face. Many Europeans viewed tensions between majority Muslim countries and the West as political in nature. Conversely, previous Gallup research on European Muslims' challenges in France, Germany, and the U.K.⁶ (three nations included in the European region for this study) highlight public perceptions that stress cultural and religious differences as inhibitors to European Muslim integration.

Respondents in the U.S. and Canada cluster were the second most likely regional population to cite conflicts in political interests as the leading cause for Muslim-West tensions. There was no statistical difference between American (35%) and Canadian (38%) respondents on this issue. While the U.S. and Canada share many cultural, linguistic, and historical similarities, in terms of foreign policy, particularly as it relates to majority Muslim countries, their policies have been different. This difference may be a crucial factor in creating a more positive public opinion of Canada than the U.S. across majority Muslim countries.

Thus, with regard to perceptions of the source of Muslim-West tensions, respondents in the MENA region and Europe were the most likely to blame tensions on political interests. Respondents in the U.S. and Canada were second most likely and respondents in sub-Saharan Africa were the least likely to say the same.

Religion

Many respondents around the world also told Gallup they viewed religious differences as the major cause of tensions between majority Muslim and Western societies. In sub-Saharan Africa, respondents were the most likely to cite religious differences (48%), especially in Senegal (60%) and Djibouti (59%). Furthermore, majorities in 4 of the 12 sub-Saharan African countries surveyed (Chad, Djibouti, Niger, and Senegal) told Gallup that Muslim-West tensions

6 The Gallup Coexist Index 2009, a Global Study of Interfaith relations. Available at: <http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/118249/Gallup-Coexist-Index-2009.aspx>

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arose more from differences in religion than culture or political interests. Pluralities in an additional four sub-Saharan African nations (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) shared this view. However, most sub-Saharan Africans are not directly affected by the political issues that often lead to tensions between Muslims and Western societies. They were also generally more positive toward the U.S.⁷ This suggests that their perceptions of the U.S. were not as affected by the conflicts in the Middle East, which may explain why they were less likely to say the issue is political. Majority Muslim communities with some of the most direct experience in the conflict (Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories) see it as political, whereas respondents in nations who view the conflicts from a distant perspective may see it as cultural and/or religious.

However, one might conclude that people living in regions with a long history of religious conflict, or geopolitical conflicts with religious underpinnings, would be more likely to view the leading causes of Muslim-West tensions as religious. Lebanon provides an important counter-example to this theory. The country experienced a civil war, which instigated sectarian religious divisions among Lebanese and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, resulting in an estimated 200,000 deaths. Yet Lebanese respondents were among the least likely around the world (16%) to see religious differences as the main cause of Muslim-West tensions.

In 2006, Israel conducted a widespread aerial assault on southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut that left some areas of the country structurally devastated. Despite the lack of direct U.S. involvement in the 2006 bombing raids, many in Lebanon and the MENA region expressed their discontent with the U.S. position. Moreover, a Gallup poll conducted in Lebanon in 2006, shortly after the 34-day conflict with Israel, highlighted the degree to which Lebanese viewed the U.S. as responsible for the developments in the summer of that year. While 81% of Lebanese placed “a great deal of responsibility” on Israel for the conflict, 67% also placed the same level of responsibility on the U.S. Sunni perceptions were not very different from national ones, but Shia were as likely to place “a great deal of blame” on the U.S. (93%) as they were on Israel (96%) for the conflict. Such discontent often plays into the frustration many in the MENA region have with U.S. foreign policy as it relates to the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. These perceptions highlight how the conflict could be seen as a proxy for Muslim-West relations. Such a deep sense of dissatisfaction may explain why nearly three out of four Lebanese cited conflicts in political interests — not differences in religion — as the leading cause of Muslim-West tensions.

Culture

Respondents who cited cultural differences as the source of Muslim-West tensions were in the minority in every region examined in this study. The region with the highest proportion of respondents who indicated culture as the source of tension was the U.S. and Canada cluster (26%). About one in four Americans (26%) said Muslim-West tensions

7 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/125720/Global-Perceptions-Leadership-Improve-2009.aspx>

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stem mainly from cultural differences, one in five Canadians (20%) shared this view. Across the globe, the Dutch had the highest proportion (29%) of respondents citing culture. Other nations with high proportions were predominantly Western ones, such as Norway (23%) and Belgium (20%). One in five Djiboutians also cited cultural differences as the main reason for Muslim-West tension.

During the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, many in the U.S. explored the potential reasons for “why they hate us.” Some observers agreed with former President George W. Bush when he said of the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and their sympathizers that “they hate our freedoms.” In reaction to this statement, a large part of the discourse throughout majority Muslim societies interpreted the “they,” referred to in the president’s statement, applied to all Muslims, not limited to a fringe minority of criminal actors.

These differing perspectives, coupled with a shift in focus on invading Afghanistan, resulted in a plethora of news stories and public discourse focused on the political realities under the Taliban. Such a dynamic may have led many in the U.S. to conclude that a major cause of Muslim-West tensions, resulting in the 9/11 attacks, was because Muslims despised the West in general, and America in particular. Muslims hated the West for the civil and political freedoms enjoyed by residents of Western societies.

Yet when Gallup asked Muslims worldwide what they admired most about the West, the two most frequent responses to an open-ended question were technology and freedom/liberty. When Gallup asked Americans what they most admired about the West, the two most common responses were freedom and technology. In fact, Gallup research has revealed that political domination, by the U.S. in particular, has been a key issue that Muslims expressed as a sticking point in Muslim-West relations. In 2009, 51% of respondents in all majority Muslim countries polled by Gallup disagreed with the statement that the U.S. is serious about supporting democracy in their regions of the world. Thus, instead of hating the West for its freedoms or democratic system of governance, many in predominantly Muslim communities admire such freedoms. Rather, they do not view the U.S., or more precisely its policies, as supporting that type of freedom in their respective societies.


When researchers, leaders, and policy makers understand the perspective from which a society defines the problem, they can address the issues relevant to the people they are trying to reach. Furthermore, since political interests tend to fluctuate more than religious or cultural change, those who view the cause of tensions as political are more likely to view them as surmountable. Those who cite religious and cultural differences are likely to be less optimistic about avoiding conflict or improving relations.

Whether one believes that the war on terror is religious or political in nature is irrelevant. Understanding how people categorize the challenges they face will enable leaders to address such issues using approaches that can change people’s perceptions.

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Figure 24: Attitudes Toward the Root Cause of Muslim-West Tensions Vary Greatly

Thinking about the tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds — do you think they arise more from differences of religion or differences of culture or from conflicts about political interests?





Section 4 - Engagement Readiness: Who Is Looking for Improved Relations?

Individuals, regardless of Muslim or Western origin, who are Not Ready for Muslim-West engagement are more likely to see the root cause of such tensions as religious. Among individuals in predominantly Muslim countries, those who attended a religious service in the last week are more likely to be Ready for engagement compared with those who are Not Ready in this group. The inverse is found in Western countries with religious service attendance higher among those Not Ready. Demographic, leadership approval, and life evaluation differences among the groups are also discussed.

There are people within both majority Muslim and Western countries who are committed to improving Muslim-West relations. There are people who believe that greater interaction between predominantly Muslim and Western societies is a benefit and that conflict between the two can be avoided. At the same time, there are others who believe the opposite. They feel that greater interaction between majority Muslim and Western societies is a threat and that conflict cannot be avoided. This group indicated there is no respect for the other side and that there is no commitment to improving relations. Both of these groups are important to the future of Muslim-West relations.

The first group of individuals includes those committed to dialogue and optimistic toward engagement and resolution of Muslim-West tensions. For purposes of this section, we referred to this group as “Ready.” The second group includes individuals who do not recognize respect and commitment to the other side, refuse dialogue, and believe in the inevitability of conflict. In the following analysis, we referred to this group as “Not Ready.”

Ready and Not Ready individuals exist in majority Muslim and Western societies. In this analysis, we specifically focused on such individuals and their perceptions, regardless of country of origin, and examined them as aggregates in majority Muslim and Western countries. For purposes of analyzing perceptions within both groups, the following items were used in the analyses to calculate and examine each population, resulting in four categories.⁸

The four categories were based on five distinct concepts, each relating to a view of self—importance, commitment, respect, interaction, and conflict. Beginning with importance, the first question in the analysis asked if the quality of the Muslim-West interaction is important to the individual. For the Ready group, a

8 Segmentation analysis for this section is based on 2008 data.

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positive response was a requirement as it begins the engagement Ready mindset. For the Not Ready group, the interaction could be important to them or not, but that importance was not necessary to qualify them as Not Ready. This first item only factored into the analysis for the Ready groups.

The next two items provide insight into how the individual perceives his or her larger society. Through the individual's lens, is his or her society committed to improving interactions between majority Muslim and Western societies? To fit into the Ready group, the individual needed to indicate that he or she perceived commitment to Muslim-West interactions from their society. Those indicating their society was not committed qualified for the Not Ready group. Similarly for respect, individuals were again asked to indicate if their society respected the "other," be it majority Muslim or Western. Those who indicated they perceive their society as respectful of the other qualified for the Ready group with those who indicated no respect falling into the Not Ready group.

Coming back to the individual view, the last two items in the analysis focused on individual perceptions related to interaction and conflict. Individuals were asked if greater interaction between predominantly Muslim and Western societies is a benefit or a threat. Individuals who indicated interaction was a benefit were eligible for the Ready group, while those who indicated interaction was a threat were eligible for the Not Ready group. The final item in the analysis asked if violent conflict between majority Muslim and Western communities can be avoided. Those indicating conflict was avoidable fell into the Ready group while those who perceived conflict as inevitable were grouped in the Not Ready category.

The Ready group included individuals who were interested in Muslim-West relations, saw their communities and themselves as committed and respectful, were positive toward interaction, and believed that conflict is avoidable. The Not Ready group was doubtful of their communities' commitment and respect for the other, they rejected interaction, and they saw Muslim-West conflict as inevitable. To qualify for either group, an individual had to provide the required five responses (Ready) or four responses (Not Ready). Individuals who provided four of the five responses required for the Ready group were removed from the analysis; therefore, it was possible that no one qualified to be in either group in some countries.

Table 25: Majority Muslim Countries

Ready	Not Ready
Yes, the quality of the interaction between Muslims and the West is important to me	
Yes, the Muslim world is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds	No, the Muslim world is not committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds
Yes, the Muslim world respects the Western world	No, the Muslim world does not respect the Western world
Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit	Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat
Yes, violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided	No, violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds cannot be avoided

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Table 26: Western Countries

Ready	Not Ready
Yes, the quality of the interaction between Muslims and the West is important to me	
Yes, the Western world is committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds	No, the Western world is not committed to improving the interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds
Yes, the Western world respects the Muslim World	No, the Western world does not respect the Muslim world
Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit	Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat
Yes, violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds can be avoided	No, violent conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds cannot be avoided

Distinctions and similarities between individuals who were receptive to improving the Muslim-West relationship and those rejecting such an effort are key to identifying both bridge builders and barriers. Insights into these groups' similarities and differences were found in their views of the Muslim-West conflict, demographic characteristics, and attitudes toward their own countries' leadership, as well as the leadership of other countries. In addition, their self-assessment of life evaluation provided valuable insights.

Source of Muslim-West Tensions

Regardless of Western or Muslim affiliation, those in the Not Ready groups were unified in identifying religion as the key source of Muslim-West tensions. Among those Ready and Not Ready from majority Muslim countries, there was a significant difference between those who reported the source of Muslim-West tensions as more political versus those who reported the tension as more religious in nature. Those in the Ready Muslim group (46%) were far more likely than those in the Not Ready Muslim group (33%) to attribute tensions to differences in political interests.

Those in the Not Ready Muslim group were more likely to attribute tensions to religious differences (55%) compared with 34% of those in the Ready Muslim group who reported the same. There were by far the smallest percentages from the Ready or Not Ready Muslim groups who pointed to differences in culture as the key factor in creating Muslim-West tensions.

Reflecting trends in majority Muslim countries, differences in political interests (39%) elicited the most widespread views among those in the Ready Western group to explain the source of Muslim-West tensions. Also paralleling majority Muslim communities, religious differences explained the origin of such tensions for 46% of Western respondents in the Not Ready group. In contrast, those in the Western Ready group included a substantial proportion of individuals who said culture is at the root of such tensions (28%) — the highest among any of the four groups examined in the study.

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The prevalence of religion as the primary cited source of tensions among Not Ready individuals in both Western and majority Muslim countries points to the potential similarities shared by these individuals regardless of their background. The pervasive belief that tensions are based in religion is a key barrier to overcome in outreach to these groups, as outlined in the previous section, *Exploring the Fault Lines: Politics, Culture, Religion*.

When the root of conflict is positioned as religious in nature, it becomes fundamental, permanent, and polarizing. Such an outlook on Muslim-West conflict alludes to an irreconcilable clash. If tensions are over religion, long-standing beliefs


that hardly, if ever, change over short periods of time, the picture painted by these perceptions is one of a clash of civilizations with Muslims and Islam on one side facing off against the West.

Previous Gallup research in *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* explored this very point. The book paints the nuances of the tensions as being largely due to differences in political interests in the eyes of many Muslim respondents across 35 predominantly Muslim nations. While those in the Not Ready group from majority Muslim countries may cite Western political interests and acute conflicts as their own grievances, they may believe that Western grievances are based in their distaste for Islam. The 2007 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) study — *Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda* — clearly illustrated a strong belief among majority Muslim countries that the goals of U.S. foreign policy were to weaken and divide Islam and to spread Christianity⁹. The Not Ready group may see the root of Muslim-West tensions as not based on Islamic principles or doctrine, but instead rooted in what they perceive the other's religious motivations to be. This leaves each group responding with “they hate me for my religion.”

With religion as the root cause of the Muslim-West tensions for the Not Ready group, it is helpful to consider the religious practices of these populations. Do those who fall into the Not Ready group hold closer to their own religious convictions than to their rejection of the other? To better understand them, we can explore who they are and what they believe.

Figure 27: Different Sources of Muslim-West Tensions for Ready and Not Ready Groups

Thinking about the tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds — do you think they arise more from differences of religion or differences of culture or from conflicts about political interests?



9 Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on civilians and al Qaeda, April 24, 2007, PIPA

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Religious Attendance

There is a commonly held perception among many, particularly in Western countries as they look eastward, that religion is the cause for animosities and tensions between majority Muslim societies and Western ones. Under this theory, it could be assumed that the Not Ready individuals, especially in majority Muslim countries, would be more engaged in their faith. The poll findings showed that those in the Ready Muslim group were more likely than those in the Not Ready Muslim group to attend a religious service in the last week. Among those in Western countries, the opposite was true as Ready respondents were less likely than Not Ready respondents to report having attended a religious service in the last seven days.


Majorities of both Ready and Not Ready residents of majority Muslim societies said they have attended a religious service in the last week. However, there was no evidence to support that religious attendance was a key factor for Muslims to be opposed to engagement with Western countries, as those more likely to attend a religious service

were in the Ready Muslim group. In previous Gallup research, including open-ended questions probing for reasons why people reject acts of violence and terror such as the 9/11 attacks, responses most often indicated verses from the Quran as the primary rationale for rejecting violence and promoting peace. Along with the current study, those data undermine arguments pointing to religious fervor among Muslims as the motivation for rejecting Muslim-West relations.

In the Western Not Ready group, the poll results ran contrary to a recent Gallup study about the relationship between religious service attendance and religious prejudice in the U.S.¹⁰ In the study, more frequent religious service attendance (more than once a week) among Americans was associated with lower self-reports of extreme prejudice¹¹ toward Muslims. As the data for this report focused on the West including several additional countries, there were distinctions that demonstrated the variety of thought among Western countries. This specifically pertains to religion where the overall percentage of the public reporting religion as important in their daily lives was 54%, compared to 93% in majority Muslim countries. Religion was one key demographic to consider for these groups, but what else do we know?

Figure 28: Religious Service Attendance Among Ready and Not Ready Groups

Have you attended a place of worship or religious service within the last seven days? - % Yes



10 Religious Perceptions in America, Gallup, 2010.

11 Respondents reporting having 'a great deal of prejudice' toward Muslims, Religious Perceptions in America, Gallup, 2010.

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Group Demographics

To many Westerners, the stereotypical image of a Muslim who hates the West is young, single, and male. Is this profile supported in the data? Who are the individuals most open to Muslim-West engagement and who are those most opposed to it? There are modest gender, age, and marital status differences between the Not Ready and Ready Muslim and Western groups.

Beginning with gender, there was no gender difference between Ready and Not Ready groups among majority Muslim populations. Among Western populations, however, men (53%) were more likely than women (47%) to be in the Ready group. Conversely, Western women were more likely to be in the Not Ready group (55%) compared to men (45%).

There were some marital-status differences between the Ready and Not Ready groups. Among majority Muslim countries, Not Ready respondents (39%) were slightly more likely than Ready respondents (35%) to be single. The opposite was true in Western countries as Ready respondents (28%) were slightly more likely than Not Ready individuals (24%) to be single.

Regarding age, the Not Ready Muslim group was not substantially younger than Ready Muslim respondents. For the Western groups, Ready Westerners were slightly younger and Not Ready Westerners were slightly older. There were no substantial differences in level of educational attainment for either the Western or the Muslim groups.

Table 29: Ready and Not Ready Groups – Demographic Characteristics

Group	% Men	% Single	Average Age	% College Educated*
Muslim Ready	57%	35%	34	7%
Muslim Not Ready	57%	39%	34	8%
Western Ready	53%	28%	45	25%
Western Not Ready	45%	24%	48	23%


* Completed four years of education beyond high school and/or received a four-year college degree

In summary, when comparing Not Ready and Ready Muslim groups, the former appeared to have no substantial differences on age or gender, but were more likely to be single. In Western countries, the group comparison painted a different picture. Not Ready Westerners were slightly older, more likely to be women, and less likely to be single compared to Ready Westerners. With similar views of religion as the root of Muslim-West tensions, the demographic profiles did not point to shared characteristics among Western and Muslim individuals in the Not Ready group.

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Views of Other Countries

Not Ready and Ready groups in both majority Muslim and Western societies had starkly different views of their own countries' leadership and the leadership of other countries. Although findings in this section were based on data collected in 2008, the contrasts in opinions of Ready and Not Ready respondents are worth noting. The differences between the Muslim groups mirrored the differences in Western groups. Individuals who were positive and open to the Muslim-West relationship were also more approving of their own countries' leadership. When Gallup examined the approval of other countries' leadership, the results shifted.



Those in the Ready Muslim group were more likely to report approving of the job performance of U.S. leadership. Interestingly, Ready Westerners were less likely than Not Ready Westerners to approve of U.S. leadership. When looking at attitudes toward the U.K., both Muslims and Westerners in the Ready category leaned toward approval rather than disapproval of that country's leadership. There was a similar pattern when Ready respondents in both societies were asked about the job performance of German and French leadership, respectively. Compared with Ready respondents, those who fell into the Not Ready groups in majority Muslim countries were less likely to approve of the leadership of France, Germany, and the U.K.

Though both Ready and Not Ready groups shared some agreement on some European country leadership, these views were not paralleled in the opinions of U.S. leadership. Opinions of U.S. leadership were indicative of an important distinction between the Ready Muslim group and Ready Western group. For Ready Westerners in 2008, a very small percentage expressed approval of then-President George W. Bush's leadership. This indicates a lack of approval in the U.S. leadership among those most receptive to relations. In contrast, at this time, Ready Muslims were more likely to approve of the U.S. leadership, creating a potential to improve relations. Additional details regarding trended and current U.S. leadership approval appear in the first section of this report.

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Life Evaluation

There was a quality of life distinction between those Ready and Not Ready in both majority Muslim and Western countries: Ready respondents were more positive than Not Ready respondents not only about their current lives, but also their expectations of a better future five years from now. This was particularly true in majority Muslim countries. The poll results showed a substantial jump in expectations of a better life in the near future among Ready Muslims compared with their Not Ready counterparts. While not a predictive analysis, this may suggest a relationship between engagement readiness and individual quality of life.

Life evaluation is a proxy measure for several key life satisfaction and wellbeing indicators. This may indicate that those more positive about Muslim-West relations would also be more positive about several life evaluation measures. A


noticeable lack of hope was prevalent among both Not Ready groups compared to their Ready counterparts, possibly illustrating a common thread among those classified as Not Ready.

These findings illustrate that the majorities in all countries were neither receptive to nor rejecting of Muslim-West relations. They may be doubtful or indifferent, but they represent a large opportunity to mobilize and influence the Muslim-West dialogue. The Ready/Neutral group notwithstanding, the second largest segment in each country was receptive to Muslim-West relations and positive toward its future.

It is a vocal minority, far outweighed by the majority, that is closed to the Muslim-West relationship. Those Not Ready for Muslim-West engagement existed in almost every country and they shared similar thoughts about the root of Muslim-West tensions, about their views of their own countries' leadership, and about their suppressed hope for the future.

Figure 31: Life Evaluation Among Ready and Not Ready Groups

Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand on in the future, say about five years from now?



SECTION 4 - ENGAGEMENT READINESS: WHO IS LOOKING FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS?

Across the world, in both majority Muslim and Western countries, Gallup found people who were ready for Muslim-West engagement. There were also those who were opposed. The individuals in the Not Ready category were more likely to see the root of Muslim-West tensions as religious in nature. Among Not Ready individuals in majority Muslim countries, this did not make them more religious. In fact, religious attendance was more associated with the Ready group in majority Muslim countries. The Not Ready group differed demographically in majority Muslim and Western countries, but they shared similar trends in approval levels of their own countries' leadership compared to their Ready counterparts. Not Ready groups were also less optimistic about their lives five years into the future compared to their Ready counterparts.

By examining engagement readiness among individuals in majority Muslim and Western countries, a better understanding of the barriers to dialogue can unfold. Greater understanding of each audience provides opportunities to remove barriers to engagement and facilitate connections and bridge building.





Section 5 - Muslims' Voices on the Meaning of Respect

More than 6 in 10 Muslims said the Muslim world respects the West, but about one-half said the West does not respect them. Among non-Muslims, one in four said the Muslim world respects the West. However, significant proportions of non-Muslims shared Muslims' sentiment that the West does not respect majority Muslim societies. Perceptions of disrespect were highest among MENA residents (65%) and lowest among residents living in Europe (35%) and sub-Saharan Africa (37%). In the United States, 53% of the American public said the West does not respect the Muslim world.

When asked what the West could do to improve relations with predominantly Muslim societies, Muslims said "respect Islam" most often. This emphasis on showing respect for Muslims' faith and its symbols was revealed in the question about what would be most significant to show respect: 72% of Muslims said abstaining from desecrating Islam's holy book and Muslim religious symbols would be very meaningful to them. Other important actions the West could take to show respect and improve relations with majority Muslim countries included: treating Muslims fairly in policies that affect them (52%) and portraying Muslim characters accurately in popular media (46%).

President Obama has repeatedly characterized his outreach to predominantly Muslim communities as based on "mutual interest and mutual respect." He emphasized the theme of mutual respect in his speech in Ankara in April 2009 and during his June 2009 address to Muslims globally from Cairo.

According to Gallup's findings, many Muslims said they believe Western countries are disrespectful of their societies, but a majority of Muslims (63%) believe the Muslim world respects Western societies. In addition to the long-lasting conflicts raging in some Muslim lands and perceptions of Western powers' interference in their countries' domestic matters, the issue of respect looms large in the minds of many in majority Muslim societies.

When Gallup asked Muslims around the world what they resent about the West, the most frequent answer was "disrespect for Islam." In their own words, Muslims spoke of the West as "working against Muslims and damaging our

SECTION 5 - MUSLIMS' VOICES ON THE MEANING OF RESPECT

image; they should stop and respect Islamic values.” Muslim respondents further underscored the importance of “not looking down on our people” and to “protest against any defiling of the Quran and punish those who do so.”

Gallup poll findings showed that while few non-Muslims think the Muslim world respects their societies (24%), significant proportions shared Muslims’ attitudes that the West does not respect the Muslim world. In the U.S. and Canada, 44% of respondents believed the West respects the Muslim world and a slim majority (53%) did not believe it did. In Europe, a slight majority (52%) said the West respects the Muslim world but slightly more than one-third did not believe it was the case.


Results from individual Western countries revealed some intriguing findings on this issue of respect. Forty-four percent of Americans believed the West respects the Muslim world while 53% said they do not believe the West respects majority Muslim societies. However, majorities in four European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) believed the West treats the Muslim world with respect. This was particularly true in Germany and the Netherlands as 65% and 56%, respectively, shared this view.

As respect is the cornerstone of successful relationship building, perceptions that reveal an imbalance



in the respect equation will likely create challenges to positive engagement and greater contact for all. The asymmetric nature of Muslim-West respect — in terms of public perceptions — is striking when comparing views of Muslims and non-Muslims, irrespective of where they live. Fewer than 3 in 10 Muslims surveyed believed the West respects the Muslim world and more than 6 in 10 believed they respect the West. Among non-Muslims, 1 in 4 believe the Muslim world respects Western societies and more than 4 in 10 shared Muslims’ views that the West does not respect predominantly Muslim societies. These findings underscore the ongoing challenges to Muslim-West relations, even when both sides are committed to improving their interaction. Based on Gallup’s findings, majorities in predominantly Muslim countries say Muslim-West relations are important to them and majorities say the Muslim world is committed to improving relations.

Figure 32: Perceptions That the West Does Not Respect the Muslim World Are Widespread

Do you believe the Western world respects the Muslim world?




SECTION 5 - MUSLIMS' VOICES ON THE MEANING OF RESPECT



Disaggregating Muslims from non-Muslims sheds light on how majority and minority populations within a given society perceive the issue of respect. Such analysis revealed perceptions are far from monolithic. As we have already seen, many Muslims believe the West treats them as inferior. Among Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries, 52% said the West lacks respect for their societies. Twenty-eight percent of these respondents said the West respects their societies and 20% said they did not know or refused.

Non-Muslims living as minorities in predominantly Muslim countries provided a different view on the respect issue. They were far less likely (26%) than their fellow Muslim citizens to believe the West is disrespectful of the societies in which they live, and many of them (40%) did not express an opinion on the matter. In Western countries, non-Muslims appeared divided on the issue of respect as about one-half said the West respects the Muslim world while the other half did not believe it was the case. The sample size of Muslim Westerners was too small to report the results.



SECTION 5 - MUSLIMS' VOICES ON THE MEANING OF RESPECT

These findings suggest that two “respect” narratives are at play in predominantly Muslim countries. However, in Western societies, many Westerners shared a common Muslim belief that the West does not respect majority Muslim communities.

But What Does It Mean to Be Respectful to Muslims?


When asked what the West could do to improve relations with majority Muslim societies, Muslims said “respect Islam” most often¹². This emphasis on showing respect for Muslims’ faith and its symbols was revealed in the question about what would be most significant to show respect. Overwhelmingly, Muslims said abstaining from desecrating Islam’s holy book and Muslim religious symbols would be very meaningful to them.

In addition to respecting Islam and its symbols, Muslim respondents indicated other actions likely to help rebalance the respect equation. Majorities of Muslims said being treated fairly in terms of policies affecting them personally and featuring Muslim characters accurately in movies were also meaningful to them.

Feelings of disrespect are most prevalent in the MENA region. At the same time, many non-Muslims, especially in the U.S. and Canada, share Muslims’ perceptions that the West does not respect the Muslim world. These results suggest that while engagement efforts are needed across regions, a particular focus on Arab countries could pay great dividends. Furthermore, Muslims’ emphasis on the importance of religious symbols underscores the need to ground respect in individuals’ complex and multidimensional identities.

Figure 36: Respect of Religious Symbols Is Critical

Many Muslims around the world have said to improve relations with the Muslim world, the West must show greater respect for Muslims and Islam. What of the following actions would be most meaningful to you? Please respond using a 5 point scale where a 1 means “not meaningful at all” and a 5 means “very meaningful.”



12 Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (Gallup 2008)



Section 6 - Perceptions in Acute Conflicts

Afghans on the War in Afghanistan


In the aftermath of 9/11, the focus of the U.S. immediately shifted to Afghanistan's rulers, the Taliban, and their harboring of al Qaeda's top leadership. For nearly two decades, the country seemed to have fallen off the radar of the global community. Since the withdrawal and collapse of the Soviet Union, few in the West were focused on the plight of Afghans. However, Gallup's long-term global research initiative has tracked Afghans' opinions for the past eight years and sheds light on a plethora of issues facing the country and its diverse population. The following is an exploration of the major challenges Afghanistan faces, as well as their assessment of the war and reconstruction efforts of various organizations, through the voices of Afghans.

Much has been written about the major security challenges facing Afghanistan. Yet when Gallup asked Afghans an open-ended question about the single-most important problem their families face today, the most frequent responses given in October 2009 were bad economy in their local city or region (21%), unemployment (20%), high costs of goods/personal financial problems (15%), and lack of security (15%).

Figure 37: Most Afghans Say Things Are Better Since the Fall of the Taliban

Are things better, worse, or the same since the fall of the Taliban in 2001?

■ Better ■ Same ■ Worse ■ Don't know



SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

A majority of Afghans (55%) said that things have gotten better in their country since the fall of the Taliban, though 21% said they have gotten worse. One in five Afghans (21%) said things are “about the same” since coalition forces invaded and overthrew the ruling regime. However, local security is still a major concern for most Afghans. In 2009, more than half (54%) of Afghans told Gallup that they do not feel safe walking alone at night in their city or local area. When asked to assess the security situation as a whole, in comparison with the previous six months, in October of 2009, a minority (18%) of Afghans said it has improved, while 32% said it has stayed the same and 37% said it has become worse. This represents a noticeable improvement since June of that same year when a slim majority of Afghans (52%) said the security situation had gotten worse.

Yet these aggregate data mask significant regional differences. In some regions, the proportion of those who said the security situation had gotten worse is dramatically higher. For example, in Nangarhar, 79% said it had gotten worse. Proportions of respondents who agreed with this assessment in Paktika (78%), Wardak (70%), Zabul (65%), and Helmand (59%) were also noticeably higher than the 37% of all Afghans highlighted above.


Afghans on NATO

Many outsiders and security experts have assessed the performance of NATO in the war effort and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Yet when Gallup asked Afghans about this issue, many described the performance of the Alliance, to some degree or another, as ineffective. When asked, on a 1 to 5 scale, how effective NATO’s efforts are in providing security at the city or local level, Afghans were divided with 28% rating their performance as “very ineffective” and 21% saying their performance in this area is “very effective.” In contrast, in December 2008, 39% of Afghans rated NATO’s capability of providing local security as “very effective” while 18% rated such performance as “very ineffective.”

A sharper contrast was found when asked about NATO’s ability to provide security on the national level. In December 2008, 44% of Afghans rated such performance as “very effective” yet in October 2009, 20% of Afghan respondents held this view. When asked what role NATO is currently playing in resolving the situation in their country, 34% said peacekeeping while 20% said that

Figure 38: Drop in Perceived Effectiveness of NATO Forces in Providing National Security

Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means “very ineffective” and 5 means “very effective, please tell me how effective you think the NATO forces have been in providing security for your country.



SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

supporting the present government is the role the coalition plays in their country. Twelve percent of Afghans cited reconstruction as the role NATO plays in Afghanistan, down significantly from June 2009 when 44% held this view.

Afghans on Their Neighbors and the United Nations

In the past few years, tensions have often risen between Afghanistan and its neighbor Pakistan. Such tensions usually arise in the context of stamping out Taliban control, or lack thereof, in the Northwestern regions of the country that border with Afghanistan. This sense of disillusionment with the role Pakistan plays in the current situation in Afghanistan is highlighted in the data. With regard to their neighbor to the southwest, a majority of Afghans (55%) described the role Pakistan plays in their country as supporting Taliban leadership. While 10% of Afghans told Gallup that Pakistan's role in their nation is one of reconstruction, 11% said Pakistan plays a role in economic development. When asked about the role India plays in their country, 29% said reconstruction and 21% said economic development. Additionally, 16% of Afghans said India plays a role in supporting the present government and 15% of Afghans said India has a peacekeeping role. When asked about the role that Iran plays in their country, nearly one-quarter of Afghans (24%) said that Iran supports the Taliban leadership, while 18% told Gallup Iran aids in economic development, and 14% cited peacekeeping as the role Iran plays within Afghanistan.

The United Nations also received mixed reviews. About one-quarter of Afghans (26%) said they play a role in reconstruction and one in five described the role the organization plays in Afghanistan as economic development. Twenty-two percent of Afghans described the U.N.'s role in their country as peacekeeping while 18% said the U.N.'s role is supporting the current government.

Afghans on the U.S. and Interaction With the West

The decision to send more troops to Afghanistan was one of the most decisive foreign policy decisions taken by Barack Obama's administration. Interestingly, in June of 2009, nearly half of Afghans felt that more U.S. troops sent to their country could help stabilize the situation in the Southern provinces.¹³ Since then, 6,000 additional U.S. troops have joined NATO and other allied troop forces in the country. Perhaps due in part to the increased presence of troops in their country, Afghans' views of the U.S. have become more negative. When compared with views of the U.S. from June 2009, Afghans' opinions in October of that year were markedly more negative. For example, in June, while 20% said they had a "very unfavorable" view of the U.S., in October this number climbed to 24%. More noticeably, the proportion of those who said they had a "somewhat unfavorable view" in October was 28% (up from 20% in June). Few Afghans reported a "favorable" view of the U.S. In June, 22% reported a "somewhat favorable" view of the U.S., but this number fell to 15% in October 2009.

Views on Muslim-West interaction also became more negative over the past few years in Afghanistan. When asked whether greater interaction between majority Muslim and Western societies was a "threat" or "benefit" to their country, Afghans held significantly more positive views on such interactions in December 2008 than they did in June 2009. Far more Afghans described such interaction as a benefit to their country in 2008 (52%) than in 2009 (33%). Furthermore,

13 Nearly Half of Afghans think More US Troops Will Help, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/123335/Nearly-Half-Afghans-Think-Troops-Help.aspx>

ambiguity on this issue rose in the country as the number of respondents who said they “don’t know” whether such interaction is a threat or benefit nearly doubled (from 12% in 2008 to 21% in 2009).

Governance

While the fundamental reason for the invasion of Afghanistan was to root out the Taliban and capture or kill al Qaeda members plotting attacks on the U.S., a major theme of Washington’s post-invasion rhetoric focused on providing Afghanistan with a functioning governance system based on the rule of law. However, until late 2009, Gallup data highlight that there was

no national consensus on the type of government Afghans viewed as the most appropriate to rule their country. When Gallup provided respondents with a series of different approaches to governance, no type of government elicited a majority response. When asked about the “best way to govern” their nation, 31% of Afghans said they preferred

Figure 40: No Consensus on How to Rule Afghanistan

Different people have different opinions about how best to govern this country. In your opinion, which of these do you think is the best possible way to govern this country? (June 2009)

■ Strong leader ■ Experts ■ Army ■ Democratic political system





Figure 39: Fewer Afghans View Muslim-West Interaction as Benefit

Which comes closer to your point of view? Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a threat. Greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds is a benefit.

■ Greater interaction is a threat ■ Greater interaction is a benefit ■ Don't know



having a strong leader who does not need to bother with parliament and elections. Twenty-two percent said that experts, not the government, should make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Yet more than one-quarter of Afghans (27%) said having a democratic political system was the best way to govern Afghanistan.

Furthermore, few Afghans said that they were satisfied with the way democracy was working in their country. In October 2009, 6% said they were “very satisfied,” 18% said they were “somewhat satisfied,” and

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS


28% said they were “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.” A plurality (46%) of Afghans either said they were “somewhat dissatisfied” (30%) or “very dissatisfied” (16%). It is important to note that these proportions have remained nearly identical since late 2008. Finally, few Afghans (5%) said they would like to see the Taliban rule the country. This opinion was consistent across most regions throughout the country, including former Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar (6%).

Afghans were also not very satisfied with the national government’s efforts at keeping them safe. With regard to the government’s efforts at stamping out terrorist activities, an overwhelming majority (72%) told Gallup in October 2009 that the government should be tougher against terrorist activities, while 20% said the government should be more lenient. When asked about government policies in eradicating poppy cultivation, half of Afghans (50%) said that such cultivation should be completely eradicated as it is an “un-Islamic” practice. Twenty-nine percent agreed that complete eradication should be the goal, but cited the poppy crop “is funding terrorist activities” as the reason for eradicating cultivation. Nearly one in five (18%) Afghans said that such cultivation provides sustenance to farmers and should be permitted to continue until the farmers are provided a viable alternative.

Perhaps this sentiment is an outcome of the local realities experienced on the ground. When asked whether the central government in Kabul has a great deal of influence in the area where they live, a slight majority of all Afghans (51%) said yes, while 41% said no. However, the aggregate data mask significant regional differences. For example, 79% of respondents in Helmand, 69% in Ghazni and Khost, as well as 54% of respondents in Herat said that the central government in Kabul did not have a great deal of influence in their local city or area.

Figure 41: Afghans' Opinions About the Influence of the Central Government on Their Communities Vary

Does the Central Government in Kabul have a great deal of influence in the area where you live?



Nearly a decade after the invasion and overthrow of the Taliban, many Afghans are still concerned about the security situation at the local and national levels. More than one-third of Afghans said the security situation is worse now than it was six months ago, and less than one in five said it has improved. While aggregate data showed a majority of Afghans affirm that, overall, things have improved in their country since the overthrow of the Taliban, such sentiments were not consistent across various regions within the country. Since December 2008 through October 2009, Afghans continued to identify the plight of their economic situation as the most important problem their “family faces.” In other words, despite some improvements and a lack of support for Taliban rule, opinions in Afghanistan on the most crucial issues the country faces, like the effectiveness and nature of government, continue to dramatically fluctuate from region to region.

Iraqis on the War in Iraq

Iraqis were sharply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines in their views of the net effect of the coalition invasion of Iraq. While residents of Shia- and Kurdish-dominated areas mostly favored it as having done more good than harm, those residing in Sunni-dominated areas largely reported the U.S.-led war did more harm than good. Though Iraqis differed on the merit of America's role in their immediate past, from our analysis it appears most Iraqis, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background, agree America's proper role moving forward is as a development partner, not as a military protector. Despite ongoing challenges, Iraqis' outlook on their everyday lives has improved over the past several years.

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 stands as one of the most significant events in the last decade, shaping U.S. and U.K. relations with predominantly Muslim communities around the world. Majorities across the studied regions reported that the coalition attack on Iraq did more harm than good.¹⁴ Most also believed the Iraq war was morally *unjustified*.

Approval of U.S. leadership dipped into the single digits among publics of even close allies in Europe and the Middle East who opposed the war in Iraq.¹⁵ Though initially supportive of it, today the majority of the American public believes the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.¹⁶

However, how do the Iraqi people view the war? Do they see the coalition troops as occupiers or liberators? Do they want the troops to leave or stay? And perhaps most importantly, looking to the future, are Iraqis' lives getting better or worse?

Iraqis on the Net Effect of Coalition Invasion

Though clear majorities in countries surrounding Iraq said they believe the Iraq war did more harm than good, Iraqi public attitudes were mixed on the relative benefit of the coalition invasion. While more Iraqis (44% vs. 27%) said the coalition invasion did more harm than good than the reverse, nearly one-quarter of Iraqis (23%) believed it made no difference. When Iraqis were asked to think about “any hardships they might have suffered since the U.S./Britain invasion, did they personally think that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth it or not?” — a slim majority (52%) said it was worth it, and 42% said it was not.

While these results paint a more positive picture of the impact of the war in Iraqis' eyes, they do not tell the whole story. Iraqi opinion on the net benefit or net harm of the coalition invasion and occupation differs sharply by region. Predominantly Shia and Kurdish governorates of Basra, Najaf, Sulaymaniya, and Arbil largely favored the coalition invasion. However, the majority Sunni Arab governorates of Anbar and Tamim — closely reflecting the opinions of the regions' publics — mostly opposed it.

14 *Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (Gallup 2008)

15 Examples include Spain, Germany, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. See <http://www.gallup.com/poll/125720/Global-Perceptions-Leadership-Improve-2009.aspx#1> and <http://www.gallup.com/poll/106417/Major-Nations-Dont-Reciprocate-US-Approval.aspx>

16 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/121727/Americans-Upbeat-Progress-Iraq-Afghanistan.aspx>

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

Figure 42: Iraqi Opinion on Net Effect of Coalition Invasion Varies Across Regions

Taking everything into consideration, do you think the Coalition invasion of Iraq has done more harm than good, or more good than harm?





Figure 43: Most in Shia-Dominated Areas Said Toppling Saddam Was Worth Coalition Invasion

Thinking about any hardships you might have suffered since the U.S./Britain invasion, do you personally think that ousting Saddam Hussein was worth it or not?



United States as Partner, Not Protector


Though Iraqis differed sharply on their views of the net effect of the invasion, very few Iraqis, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background, supported the long-term presence of foreign troops in Iraq. Overall, in June 2008, the majority of Iraqis (89%) said they want coalition troops to leave immediately or in the next few months, while only 9% wanted them to stay in Iraq for a longer period.

Not surprisingly, the majority in the Sunni-dominated provinces of Tamim and Anbar, who mostly opposed the invasion, said they want the troops to leave immediately. However, even among the Shia-dominated provinces of Basra and Najaf who largely believed the net effect of the invasion was positive, majorities (60%) said they want the troops to leave immediately with 24% extending this desired period by only a few months.

In the Kurdish-dominated areas of Arbil and Sulaymaniya, the majority said they want the troops to leave soon, though most (65%) said they want the troops to exit the area over the next few months, with roughly one-quarter advocating for immediate departure.

Figure 44: In 2009, Most Iraqis Wanted Immediate Coalition Troop Pull Out

In your opinion which would you prefer — for the U.S. and British forces to leave immediately, in the next few months, or do you think they should stay in Iraq for a longer period of time?



United States as Partner

Though most Iraqis seemed not to favor a role for the U.S. as a permanent protector, most did seem to welcome a role for the U.S. as a partner. In 2008, most Iraqis (67%) said they believe the U.S. is serious about improving economic conditions in Iraq, up from 54% in 2004. A similar proportion (63%) also expressed faith that the U.S. was serious about the establishment of democracy in Iraq (up from 51% in 2004). Roughly 7 in 10 said the U.S. will allow Iraq to fashion its own future without American interference. This particular item increased the most since 2004, when 37% of Iraqis said the same and 27% refused to respond.

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

Surprisingly, despite opposing the invasion, residents of Sunni-dominated provinces were among the most likely to express an attitude of good faith on U.S. intentions toward economic and democratic support of their region. This stands in contrast to their ethnic and sectarian counterparts in the larger Middle East region.¹⁷

Figure 45: Iraqi Faith in U.S. Goodwill Increased From 2004 to 2008

I will read out to you a set of statements, which you may or may not totally agree with. As I read them out I would like you to indicate whether you agree or disagree with each:


The U.S. will keep its promise that it does not intend to remain in Iraq for many years as some believe.

The U.S. is very serious about improving the economic lot of the Iraqis.

The U.S. will allow Iraqis to design their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influence.

The U.S. is very serious about establishing a democratic system in Iraq.

% Yes



In August 2009, Iraqis' approval of U.S. leadership stood at 33%. This compares to 15% in March of the same year, signaling improvements in Iraqi confidence in the new U.S. administration as they learned more about it. For reference, the August 2009 poll found that Iraqis' approval of their own leadership was 28% while approval of the job performance of Iran's leadership was 22%.

17 *Who Speaks for Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (Gallup 2008)

Life in Iraq: the Future

Although Iraqis may be deeply divided on how they view their past, several indicators suggest momentum toward improvement. Between summer 2008 and spring 2010, perceptions have improved on several fronts.

Looking at basic needs, the proportion of Iraqis reporting there were times in the past year when they had to go without food decreased from 25% in 2008 to 18% in 2010. Those assessing the job market¹⁸ positively rose slightly from 28% to 33%. Respondents who rated economic conditions as either “good” or “excellent” went up from 23% to 39%. Most significantly, the perceived “fairness” of the system has improved. The proportion of Iraqis who said they can get ahead by “working hard” went up from 53% to 62%, further suggesting an improved outlook. However, in 2010, 13% of Iraqis still said they lacked enough clean water in the past day, underscoring ongoing challenges faced by some Iraqis in attaining basic needs.

Many commentators have attributed failure in providing basic public services in Iraq to a failure in governance. Iraqis’ perceptions of government corruption are high, but decreasing, albeit slightly. In 2010, 72% of respondents said corruption was rampant in the government, down from 84% in 2008. Perceptions have also modestly improved on government efforts to fight corruption. In 2010, 26% of Iraqis said they were satisfied with the government’s efforts to fight corruption, up from 13% in 2008.

These general trends may explain a diminishing desire among Iraqis to leave their country. Whereas in 2008, a full one-fifth of Iraqis said they intended to emigrate, such desire to leave their communities dipped to 13% in 2010. For reference, the median among Arab League countries for desire to emigrate in 2009 was roughly one-quarter.¹⁹

While Iraqis were split on their perceptions of the coalition invasion of their country, based on our analysis, it appears they mostly agree that they want the U.S. as a partner, not a protector. Iraqis still face significant challenges in meeting basic needs, but the perceived movement is toward improvement.

18 Thinking about the job situation in the city or area where you live today, would you say that it is now a good time or a bad time to find a job?

19 *The Silatech Index: Voices of Young Arabs*, January 2010. Silatech, Gallup.

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Through the Eyes of Those Who Live It

When asked in the late summer through early fall of 2008 about the root causes of tensions between Western and predominantly Muslim societies, Israeli Jews said such tensions stem more from religious (41%) and cultural (20%) differences. About one-third of Israeli Jews cited political differences to explain Muslim-West tensions. For Palestinians, however, political interests (52%) were the most important factors that explain tensions between Western and majority Muslim societies.

The possibility of an enduring peace between Israelis and Palestinians looks dim: two-thirds of Israeli Jews and three-quarters of Palestinians did not believe a permanent peace will ever be achieved. Non-Jewish/secular Israelis appeared less gloomy about the conflict outcome, as 45% said they do not think peace will ever be achieved.

At the same time, majorities in all populations surveyed expressed some level of support for the peace process. But non-Jewish/secular Israelis (57%) were, by far, the most likely group to say they *strongly* support it. Among Palestinians, 35% expressed *strong* support for the peace process while 13% of Israeli Jews said the same.

Of all the protracted conflicts that have marked modern history, the Israeli-Palestinian strife has captured the public psyche of residents in the MENA region in powerful ways. The conflict appears intractable due to its complex mix of geopolitical context, nationalistic elements, sensitive religious connotations, and current dynamics. The challenge to conflict resolution intensifies as each side expresses deeply entrenched opinions about the justness of their respective goals and positions.

In a region where symbolism is not only powerful, but where the words and deeds on each side are carefully analyzed for double-meanings and innuendos, it becomes crucial to go beyond the opinions of pundits. Listening to the voices of Israelis and Palestinians who experience the consequences of this long-lasting conflict can shed light on the current stalemate. Perhaps their collective wisdom can offer insights to inform and move the debate toward a peaceful resolution.

Our survey research spans from the late summer and early fall of 2008 to early 2010. In Israel, both Jewish and non-Jewish populations were surveyed. Seventy-six percent of Israeli respondents identified with Judaism, 11% said their religious affiliation was Islam, 9% said they were secular or did not identify with a specific faith, and 2% said they were Christians. Regardless of religious affiliation, virtually all respondents said they were Israeli citizens. In the Palestinian Territories, poll results include Muslims and Christians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

Overall, the poll results underscore major differences between Israelis and Palestinians in terms of attitudes toward the peace process. Differences between Israelis and Palestinians, especially those living in Gaza, are particularly striking when examining perceptions of personal economics and emotional health. Furthermore, the poll findings revealed large gaps in attitudes vis-à-vis a wide range of issues between Israeli Jews and Israelis who identify with Islam, Christianity, or no faith (defined hereafter as non-Jewish/secular Israelis). This highlights the dual narratives within Israel on salient issues of peace, security, jobs, and economic wellbeing.


At the same time, both Israelis and Palestinians are in sync on many aspects of their respective societies. For example, both populations, regardless of religious affiliation or lack of faith, expressed similar views regarding corruption in their countries and efforts to alleviate poverty in their respective societies.

Israelis' and Palestinians' Views on Muslim-West Tensions

Asking all populations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories about the root causes of tensions that exist between Western and majority Muslim societies provides an important proxy to gauge the different approaches used to frame the path to conflict resolution. When asked in 2008 whether such tensions arise from differences of culture, differences of religion, or conflicts about political interests, two perspectives emerge.

Israeli Jews indicated the tensions between Western and majority Muslim countries stem more from religious (41%) and cultural (20%) differences. For Palestinians, however, political interests (52%) were the most important factors that explain such tensions. As a point of comparison, about one-third of Israeli Jews said it is rooted in political interest differences. Non-Jewish/secular Israelis also pointed to politics (43%) as the more salient reason for Muslim-West tensions, although they were less likely than Palestinians to say this.

These findings underscore the different narratives that have emerged throughout the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Two different, yet powerful, ethos appear to have shaped these narratives, highlighting the challenges of achieving peace.



Attitudes Toward Resolution of the Conflict

It is important to note that the findings in this sub-section are based on data collected in the late summer and early fall 2008 (during the six-month truce agreement between Israel and Hamas, which ended in December of that year). Thus, the findings predate Israel's military operation in Gaza that took place between December 2008 and January 2009.

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS


Gallup conducted a subsequent poll in Israel in the fall of 2009 to track potential changes in attitudes on these same issues, namely the state of relations with Palestinians and the peace process. The 2009 data from Israel did not show much change. The same questions were not fielded in 2009 or 2010 in the Palestinian Territories.

For most Israelis and Palestinians, the possibility of an enduring peace between the two sides looks dim. When asked if permanent peace between Israel and Palestine will ever be achieved, 66% of Israeli Jews and 75% of Palestinians said no.²⁰ The protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may explain, at least in part, why majorities on both sides appear so disillusioned about a peaceful resolution to the conflict, even in the distant future.

But non-Jewish/secular Israelis were less gloomy about the conflict outcome. While 45% did not think peace will ever be achieved, 41% said it will, and 14% did not express an opinion on this issue. Due to the unique characteristics of most respondents in this group — most are both Israeli and Arab — their relatively more optimistic views toward the potential for peace represent assets that should be tapped.

Figure 47: A Permanent Peace Viewed as Elusive


Do you think that a permanent peace between Israel and Palestine will ever be achieved?



Israel: Sept 18-Oct.6, 2008; Palestinian Territories: Aug 9-20, 2008

Figure 48: Level of Support for the Peace Process Varies Greatly

In principle, do you support or oppose the peace process with the Israelis/Palestinians? (INTERVIEWER NOTE: If support, ask:) Do you support it strongly or moderately? (If opposed, ask:) Do you oppose it strongly or moderately?




Israel: Sept 18-Oct.6, 2008; Palestinian Territories: Aug 9-20, 2008

²⁰ In the poll, the question was worded as follows: Do you think that a permanent peace between Israel and Palestine will ever be achieved?

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

The notion that non-Jewish/secular Israelis are critical voices to help move the peace debate in a positive direction was reinforced by their level of support for the peace process. And while majorities in all populations surveyed expressed some level of support for the process, non-Jewish/secular Israelis (57%) were, by far, the most likely group to say they strongly support it. Among Palestinians, 35% expressed strong support for the peace process (West Bank: 32%, East Jerusalem: 36%, and Gaza: 37%). Among Israeli Jews, 13% told Gallup they strongly support the peace process with Palestinians.

As Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, “Peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek, but a means by which we arrive at that goal.” Asking Israelis and Palestinians in 2008 about the means to reach self-determination and security for their respective people revealed major differences. Palestinians showed a preference for non-violent means (53%) compared with armed struggle (30%). Belief in non-violent means was about equal across the three Palestinian areas: 51% in the West Bank, 55% in Gaza, and 53% in East Jerusalem. And while the belief in armed struggle to achieve self-determination and security for their people was highest in the Gaza Strip (37%), Gazans still leaned in favor of non-violent means.



Israeli Jews appeared almost equally divided between non-violent forms of resistance (44%) and military solutions (40%). Pacifist attitudes to achieve self-determination and security were most prevalent among non-Jewish/secular Israelis (61%). This further reinforces the notion that non-Jewish/secular Israelis could play a unique role in shaping the peace debate.

Narratives of Daily Life


Living in a conflict zone presents multiple challenges, even if the violent strife occurs intermittently. It remains important to examine the realities those populations face every day.

In the fall of 2009, one-third of Israeli Jews found it difficult (28%) or very difficult (5%) to live on their present income. In early 2010, almost 6 in 10 Palestinians in the West Bank said they found it difficult (24%) or very difficult (34%).

SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

Figure 50: Severe Financial Challenges Are a Reality for Most Palestinians

Which one of these phrases comes closest to your own feelings about your household's income these days?




Israel: Oct 11-Nov 5, 2009; Palestinian Territories: Feb 4-20, 2010

The proportion facing economic challenges rose to two-thirds in Gaza where 16% told Gallup they found it difficult to live on their present income and 50% reported it was very difficult. The sample size of Palestinians in East Jerusalem was too small to report results in 2010. Comparing self-reports of household income in the Palestinian Territories with those of people living in Mali, where human development is one of the lowest in the world, provides some perspective against which the results, especially for those living in Gaza, can be considered. In late 2009, Malians (48%) were as likely as residents in Gaza to say they found it very difficult to live on their present income and 36% of Malians reported finding it difficult.

Israelis and Palestinians also have different emotional health realities. A total of 43% of Palestinians (39% in the West Bank and 40% in Gaza) said they experienced feeling a lot of anger the day before the interview. As points of comparison, 33% of

Figure 51: Dissatisfaction With Efforts to Alleviate Poverty

In (country name), are you satisfied or dissatisfied with efforts to deal with the poor?



Israel: Oct 11-Nov 5, 2009; Palestinian Territories: Feb 4-20, 2010



SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

Israeli Jews said the same. Among non-Jewish/secular Israelis, 23% said they experienced a lot of anger the day before the interview.

Despite differences in the emotional aspects of their lives, Israelis and Palestinians related similar narratives when asked about other important dimensions of their daily experience. Strong majorities across all groups surveyed considered corruption to be rampant in their societies. In Israel, in the fall of 2009, 87% of respondents (88% among Israeli Jews and 80% among non-Jewish/secular Israelis) said corruption in their government is widespread. But the 2009 corruption measures were virtually unchanged from those collected in the fall of 2008 when Ehud Olmert, then Prime Minister of Israel, was accused of corruption. In the Palestinian Territories, perceptions of corruption, while still common, were less widespread than in Israel. In early 2010, 65% of respondents said the same about the prevalence of corruption in their own government (63% in the West Bank and 64% in Gaza). Since Gallup started to measure this issue, views as to how widespread government corruption is in the Palestinian Territories have remained steady in the West Bank. In Gaza, however, they dropped from 61% to 53% between August 2008 and February 2009. Since then, they have increased back to their 2008 levels of about 65% of Gazans who said government corruption is widespread in their area.

Doing more to alleviate poverty is also a goal shared by majorities of Israelis and Palestinians in their respective societies. Three-quarters of Israeli Jews said they are dissatisfied with such efforts in their country, while 80% of non-Jewish/secular Israelis said the same. In the Palestinian Territories, two-thirds of respondents said they are dissatisfied with efforts to help the poor.

Approval of the leadership of one's country in Israel and the Palestinian Territories is important to better understanding internal political dynamics within each, particularly when looking at the distinctions by region and religious affiliation.



SECTION 6 - PERCEPTIONS IN ACUTE CONFLICTS

In the late summer and early fall of 2008, Israeli Jews (36%) and non-Jewish/secular Israelis (38%) had similar rates of approval of their country's leadership. However, by September 2009 (several months after Parliamentary elections brought a coalition government to power, headed by Binyamin Netanyahu), Israelis' opinions of the job performance of their new government had diverged. The poll findings showed that while a slight majority of Israeli Jews said they approved of their country's leadership at that time, such approval among non-Jewish/secular Israelis dipped to 25%. The September 2009 data provided our most current measure on this issue.

In the Palestinian Territories, two different political leaderships (Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza) exist. As a result, it is important to separate attitudes of Palestinians in the two areas. In late summer and early fall 2008, Palestinians in the West Bank (45%) were far more likely than those in Gaza (34%) to say they approved of the job performance of their leadership. About one year later in September 2009, Palestinians' opinions of their respective leadership were virtually unchanged, 43% and 38%, respectively. However, in early 2010, public approval of the leadership in the West Bank increased to 57% while approval of the leadership in Gaza stayed flat at 39%. The sample size of Palestinians in East Jerusalem was too small to report results in 2010.

While differences between Israelis and Palestinians cannot be overlooked, striving for good governance and the rule of law, as well as fighting socioeconomic inequalities are goals shared by all.

In early 2009, Palestinians' approval of the job performance of U.S. leadership stood at 7%, down from 13% from the previous year. But in the fall of 2009 (and after President Obama's Cairo speech), Palestinians' approval of U.S. leadership increased to 20%. In early 2010, Palestinians' approval of the job performance of U.S. leadership remained steady at 16%.

Approval of U.S. leadership among Israeli Jews over roughly the same time period remained flat (from 71% to 67%) between the summers of 2008 and 2009. Another poll by Smith Research,²¹ which was conducted after the presidential address in Cairo, has shown that one-half of Israelis viewed the U.S. administration's policies as more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli, 6% said the policies are more pro-Israeli than pro-Palestinian, 36% viewed them as neutral, and 8% did not express an opinion.

While President Obama has started to engage Muslims around the world, it can be argued that he also needs to speak directly to Israelis. In order to have a peaceful resolution to the conflict, people on both sides need to perceive it will afford them security and dignity.

21 <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=171849>





Section 7 - Recommendations

Policy recommendations are often based on the individual efforts and theories of subject matter experts. However, public opinion research, when conducted in a reliable manner, can also serve as a valuable tool in evaluating or adjusting current policies as well as developing new ones. Policies informed by perceptions of individuals affected by such decisions can incorporate critical insights into the decision-making process and thus create opportunities for informed, specific, and meaningful change. In fact, such policies, particularly in the realm of public diplomacy, are most effective when informed by the perceptions of their targets, namely the hearts and minds of people around the globe.

Beyond public diplomacy, perceptions of those living in conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan also provide a valuable tool in developing policies that have the best chance of gaining the support and cooperation of those on the receiving end of such decisions. The following are six policy recommendations based on Gallup's findings highlighted throughout this report.

Some of the recommendations are more relevant for government officials and decision makers. Others, such as NGOs and community organizations can benefit by framing their projects and programs in a manner that is most receptive to people's perceptions in Western and majority Muslim societies.

1. When engaging Muslims globally, focus the most effort in the area of greatest need and receptivity, the MENA region.

While the MENA region makes up about 15% to 20% of the global Muslim community, it commands a great deal of influence throughout the greater Muslim population globally. It is also the region where the public pays the most attention to Muslim-West relations. This suggests that in the MENA region public diplomacy efforts are noticed and make a difference. While there has been little to no change in perceptions regarding Muslim-West relations across majority Muslim societies in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, perceptions in the MENA region have witnessed a notable improvement since President Obama took office. Thought leaders within the MENA region should also focus their efforts on building opportunities for collaboration with Western countries. As Muslim-West relations are of particular interest to publics in this part of the world, indigenous institutions within the region should prioritize their programs and efforts accordingly.

2. Leadership in both Western societies as well as majority Muslim ones should more effectively communicate on-the-ground initiatives within majority Muslim societies and the West. Such efforts should emphasize areas of partnership that go beyond security concerns, such as science, technology, and entrepreneurship.

The conflicts shaping MENA public perceptions, most importantly Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, are complex and will take time to resolve. Initial goodwill from MENA residents toward U.S. leadership is eroding quickly as much focus in the region is placed on resolving such conflicts. For example, an IDSC poll in Egypt conducted after President Obama's Cairo speech highlighted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the most important topic covered by the speech. Shifting the focus to what the U.S. is doing on the ground through the various initiatives announced in the Cairo speech will allow such efforts to have a greater impact on public perceptions regarding Muslim-West relations. Furthermore, an essential tool in assessing current initiatives as well as launching new ones should be to systemize broad-based feedback: create a system designed to enable Western and majority Muslim society leaders to absorb feedback in a systematic way from both communities on such collaboration initiatives.

3. Policy initiatives should continue to emphasize mutual respect and mutual interests by discussing the fairness of decisions and actions, in addition to continuing to use culturally appropriate narratives.

Half of Muslims around the world believe the West does not respect the Muslim world. This ranges from a high of 65% in MENA to a low of 37% in Africa, with a sizable segment who say they “don't know.” The most frequently cited “meaningful action” in showing respect for Muslims was to abstain from desecrating Muslim religious symbols such as the Quran (72% of Muslims said it is “very meaningful”). However, a fundamental component of mutual respect is a perception that each treats the other with fairness. In fact, 54% of Muslims globally said that treating Muslims fairly in policies that affect them would be very meaningful in improving relations with their societies. The perception that the U.S. does not treat majority Muslim countries in a fair manner will continue to be a hurdle to engagement despite well-crafted messages of public diplomacy.

4. In engaging diplomatically and building efforts for collaboration, majority Muslim and Western society leaders must emphasize resolving political issues rather than religious conflict.

Among both majority Muslim and Western countries, those “Not Ready” for engagement were more likely to view Muslim-West tensions as rooted in religion. Blaming religious differences as a permanent source of tensions allows those in the Not Ready group to remain so indefinitely with no reason to re-evaluate Muslim-West relations. Leaders should avoid framing the conflict through the lens of Islam vs. the West and instead use faith and common values as grounds for engagement.

SECTION 7 - RECOMMENDATIONS

In majority Muslim countries, those who said religion plays an important role in their lives were more likely to fall in the “Ready” for engagement group. In Western countries, those for whom religion is important were more likely to fall in the Not Ready group. Thus, Islam does not categorically divide Muslims from the West. When tensions are framed in the Islam vs. the West paradigm, it alienates those in majority Muslim countries with the highest potential to serve as partners for engagement.

Furthermore, people who believed the conflict is based on transient political factors were more likely to view the conflict as solvable. However, those who believed the conflict is rooted in enduring religious beliefs and values viewed it as less avoidable. Large proportions of individuals in several countries that currently have strained relations with the U.S. saw the conflict as political and therefore resolvable. Furthermore, in MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, the U.S. and Canada, those who said Muslim-West tensions arise mostly from conflicts in political interests were more likely to say the conflict is avoidable.

5. In Afghanistan, the central government should focus its efforts on projects/initiatives that speak to the one thing that all Afghans share — financial and economic development concerns.

In doing so, instead of pursuing one broad national solution, the Afghan government, in cooperation with its international partners should pursue and implement local strategies to address local needs. Overall, Afghans are fragmented across provinces and ethnicities as to their views of their country’s challenges and their perceived solutions to such challenges. While there is little consensus across regions on views of effectiveness of the government, its influence and their ability to control the security situation, economic concerns are shared across the country. For Afghans, national efforts focused on sustainable economic solutions will highlight a substantial benefit to the national unity project in their country.

6. In Iraq, as the U.S. proceeds to a complete withdrawal of military forces, such actions should be followed up with a humanitarian surge, organized in cooperation with the Iraqi government. This will help rebuild Iraq with partners from the international community.

Overall, Iraqi perceptions underscored an expectation that the U.S. is serious about economic development and democracy in their country despite the perception that times are still tough in Iraq. Iraqis continue to be receptive to partnerships with the U.S. Thus, while many still believe that the U.S. will keep its promise to leave and allow Iraqis to fashion their own political future, a desire for continued partnership in building and supporting democratic systems of governance and socioeconomic development still remains.





Methodology

The Gallup World Poll continually surveys residents in more than 150 countries, representing more than 98% of the world's adult population, using randomly selected, nationally representative samples. Gallup typically surveys 1,000 individuals in each country, using a standard set of core questions that have been translated into the major languages of the respective country. For this study, supplemental, region-specific questions were asked in addition to core questions. Interviews were conducted either face-to-face or by telephone, with face-to-face interviews lasting approximately one hour and telephone interviews lasting approximately 30 minutes.

Gallup is entirely responsible for the management, design, and control of the Gallup World Poll. For the past 70 years, Gallup has been committed to the principle that accurately collecting and disseminating the opinions and aspirations of people around the globe is vital to understanding our world. Gallup's mission is to provide information in an objective, reliable, and scientifically-grounded manner. Gallup is not associated with any political orientation, party, or advocacy group and does not accept partisan entities as clients. Any individual, institution, or governmental agency may access the Gallup World Poll regardless of nationality. The identities of clients and all surveyed respondents will remain confidential.

Translation

The questionnaire is translated into the major languages of each country. The translation process starts with an English, French, or Spanish version, depending on the region. A translator who is proficient in the original and target languages translates the survey into the target language. A second translator reviews the language version against the original version and recommends refinements.

Data Collection

With some exceptions, all samples are probability based and nationally representative of the resident population aged 15 and older. The coverage area is the entire country including rural areas, and the sampling frame represents the entire civilian, non-institutionalized, aged 15 and older population of the entire country. Exceptions include areas where the safety of interviewing staff is threatened, scarcely populated islands in some countries, and areas that interviewers can reach only by foot, animal, or small boat.

Sampling

Face-to-Face Survey Design

First Stage: In countries where face-to-face surveys are conducted, the first stage of sampling is the identification of PSUs (Primary Sampling Units), consisting of clusters of households. PSUs are stratified by population size and/or geography and clustering is achieved through one or more stages of sampling. Where population information is available, sample selection is based on probabilities proportional to population size, otherwise simple random sampling is used.

Second Stage: Random route procedures are used to select sampled households. Unless an outright refusal occurs, interviewers make up to three attempts to survey the sampled household. To increase the probability of contact and completion, attempts are made at different times of the day and, where possible, on different days. If an interview cannot be obtained at the initial sampled household, a simple substitution method is used.

Third Stage: Respondents are randomly selected within the selected households. Interviewers list all eligible household members and their ages or birthdays. The respondent is selected by means of the Kish grid in countries where face-to-face interviewing is used. The person who answers the door is not informed of the selection criteria until after the respondent has been identified.

Telephone Survey Design

In countries where telephone interviewing is employed, Random-Digit-Dial (RDD) of a nationally representative list of phone numbers is used. In select countries where cell phone penetration is high, a dual sampling frame is used. Random respondent selection is achieved by using either the latest birthday or Kish grid method. At least three attempts are made to reach a person in each household, spread over different days and times of day. Appointments for call-backs that fall within the survey data collection period are made.

Data Preparation

The data set goes through a rigorous quality assurance process before being publicly released. Gallup's directors of survey research in each region of the world review the data for consistency and stability by interviewer and region. If the regional director suspects a problem, it may be necessary to collect new data. After review by the regional directors, Gallup scientists perform additional validity reviews. The data are centrally aggregated and cleaned, ensuring correct variable codes and labels are applied. The data are then reviewed in detail for logical consistency and trends over time. Once the data are cleaned, weighted, and vetted, the final step is to calculate approximate study design effect and margin of error.

Data Weighting

Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally representative sample for each country and is intended to be used for calculations within a country.

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First, base sampling weights are constructed to account for oversamples and household size. If an oversample has been conducted, the data are weighted to correct the disproportionate sample. Weighting by household size (number of residents aged 15 and older) is used to adjust for the probability of selection, as residents in large households will have a disproportionately lower probability of being selected for the sample. (Weighting by household size was introduced for data collected in 2008.)

Second, post-stratification weights are constructed. Population statistics are used to weight the data by gender, age, and, where reliable data are available, education or socioeconomic status.

Finally, approximate study design effect and margin of error are calculated (calculations are presented in the methodology table below). The design effect calculation reflects the influence of data weighting and does not incorporate the intraclass correlation coefficients.

Margin of Error

The maximum margin of error is calculated based on reported proportions for each country-level data set, assuming a 95% confidence level. The margin of error also includes the approximate design effect for the total country sample.

Annex – Data Collection and Sample Information

Country	Data Collection Dates	Number of Interviews	Design Effect ^a	Margin of Error ^b	Mode of Interviewing	Languages	Over-sample ^c	Exclusions (Samples are nationally representative unless noted otherwise)
Afghanistan	Nov 22 – Dec 13, 2008	1,010	1.43	3.7	Face-to-face	Dari, Pashto		
	Jun 4 – Jun 16, 2009	1,000	1.66	4.0				
	Sep 20 – Oct 12, 2009	1,000	1.68	4.0				
	Apr 13 – Apr 22, 2010	1,000	1.72	4.1				
Albania	Sep 6 – Sep 16, 2008	1,020	1.37	3.6	Face-to-face	Albanian		(2008) Representative of age 18 and older
	Sep 7 – Oct 2, 2009	1,000	1.45	3.7				(2009) Nationally Representative
Algeria	Apr 9 – Jun 29, 2008	1,101	1.54	3.7	Face-to-face	Arabic		(2008) Nationally Representative
	Feb 21 – Mar 22, 2009	1,000	1.27	3.5				(2009) The deep South was excluded, less than 10% of the population.
	Aug 1 – Sep 12, 2009	1,000	1.24	3.5				(2010) The sparsely populated deep South and governorates that represent security risks within Algiers were excluded. The excluded areas represent approximately 25% of the population.
	Feb 1 – Mar 7, 2010	1,001	1.41	3.7				

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Country	Data Collection Dates	Number of Interviews	Design Effect ^a	Margin of Error ^b	Mode of Interviewing	Languages	Over-sample ^c	Exclusions (Samples are nationally representative unless noted otherwise)
Azerbaijan	Oct 16 – Nov 5, 2008	1,000	1.39	3.7	Face-to-face	Azeri, Russian		Nagorno-Karabakh and territories excluded for safety of interviewers, less than 10% of the total population.
	Jul 29 – Aug 16, 2009	1,000	1.32	3.6				
Bahrain	Feb 23 – Mar 19, 2009	1,051	1.28	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic		Includes Bahrainis and Arab expatriates; non-Arabs were excluded, approximately 25% of the population
	Aug 17 – Sep 15, 2009	1,077	1.27	3.3				
Bangladesh	May 28 – Jun 13, 2008	1,000	1.23	3.4	Face-to-face	Bengali		
	Apr 29 – May 14, 2009	1,000	1.22	3.4				
	Apr 12 – Apr 24, 2010	1,000	1.25	3.5				
Belgium	May 23 – Jun 13, 2008	1,002	1.56	3.9	Landline Telephone	Dutch and French		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sep 6 – Sep 16, 2008	1,009	1.47	3.7	Face-to-face	Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian		
	Sep 8 – Sep 30, 2009	1,023	1.81	4.2				
Burkina Faso	Apr 10 – Apr 18, 2008	1,000	1.74	4.1	Face-to-face	French, Moore, Dioula, Fulfulde		
Canada	Aug 7 – Sep 7, 2008	1,005	1.61	3.9	Landline Telephone	English, French		Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut were excluded from the sample.
	Aug 7 – Aug 25, 2009	1,011	1.64	4.0	Face-to-face			
Chad	Oct 29 – Nov 8, 2008	1,000	2.02	4.4	Face-to-face	French, Chadian Arabic, Ngambay		Excludes Eastern Chad on the border with Sudan, approximately 20% of the population. The sample skews highly educated.
	Nov 20 – Dec 2, 2009	1,000	1.92	4.3				
Comoros	Feb 23 – Mar 5, 2009	1,000	1.44	3.7	Face-to-face	French, Comorian		
	Jul 15 – Oct 10, 2009	1,000	1.5	3.8				
Djibouti	Sep 1 – Sep 9, 2008	1,000	1.22	3.4	Face-to-face	French, Somali, Afar		
	Mar 2 – Mar 12, 2009	1,000	1.89	3.4				
	Jul 25 – Aug 2, 2009	1,000	1.25	3.5				
Egypt	Apr 23 – May 18, 2008	1,105	1.31	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Mar 7 – Mar 22, 2009	1,080	1.29	3.4				
	Aug 11 – Aug 19, 2009	1,032	1.28	3.5				
	Mar 13 – Mar 23, 2010	1,042	1.22	3.4				
France	Jun 5 – Jun 20, 2008	1,006	1.72	4.1	Landline Telephone	French		
	Apr 16 – May 18, 2009	1,000	1.57	3.9				
Germany	May 20 – Jun 24, 2008	1,011	1.41	3.7	Landline Telephone	German		
Indonesia	Mar 15 – Mar 25, 2008	1,050	1.37	3.5	Face-to-face	Bahasa Indonesia		
	Apr 18 – May 5, 2009	1,080	1.41	3.5				
	Apr 4 – Apr 24, 2010	1,080	1.36	3.5				

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Country	Data Collection Dates	Number of Interviews	Design Effect ^a	Margin of Error ^b	Mode of Interviewing	Languages	Over-sample ^c	Exclusions (Samples are nationally representative unless noted otherwise)
Iran	Apr 30 – May 31, 2008	1,040	1.32	3.5	Face-to-face	Farsi		
Iraq	Mar 5 – Jun 14, 2008	990	1.38	3.7	Face-to-face	Arabic, Kurdish		
	Feb 20 – Mar 12, 2009	1,000	1.43	3.7				
	Aug 10 – Aug 20, 2009	1,000	1.41	3.6				
	Feb 17 – Feb 27, 2010	1,000	1.33	3.6				
Israel	Sep 18 – Oct 6, 2008	1,001	1.28	3.5	Face-to-face	Hebrew, Arabic		East Jerusalem is excluded from Israel and is included in the sample of Palestinian Territories.
	Oct 11 – Nov 5, 2009	1,000	1.27	3.5				
Italy	May 28 – Jun 17, 2008	1,008	1.71	4.0	(2008) Landline, and (2009) Cellular Telephone	Italian		
	Apr 21 – May 6, 2009	1,005	1.71	4.0				
Ivory Coast	Apr 4 – Apr 15, 2009	1,000	1.26	3.5	Face-to-face	Dioula, French		
Jordan	Jul 2 – Aug 15, 2008	1,007	1.19	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Mar 18 – Apr 2, 2009	1,015	1.19	3.4				
	Sep 23 – Oct 10, 2009	1,001	1.23	3.4				
Kazakhstan	Oct 7 – Nov 21, 2008	1,000	1.53	3.8	Face-to-face	Russian, Kazakh		
	Jul 2 – Aug 6, 2009	1,000	1.30	3.5				
Kosovo	Sep 12 – Oct 12, 2008	1,047	1.44	3.6	Face-to-face	Albanian, Serbian, (2009) Montenegrin		
	Sep 8 – Sep 24, 2009	1,000	1.82	4.2				
Kuwait	Feb 23 – Mar 18, 2009	1,000	1.23	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic		Includes Kuwaitis and Arab expatriates; non-Arabs were excluded, approximately 20% of the population.
	Aug 10 – Aug 30, 2009	1,000	1.15	3.3				
Kyrgyzstan	Jun 6 – Jul 12, 2008	1,000	1.44	3.7	Face-to-face	Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek		
	Jun 13 – July 10, 2009	1,000	1.55	3.9				
Lebanon	Apr 2 – May 14, 2008	1,000	1.48	3.8	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Feb 18 – Mar 20, 2009	1,002	1.23	3.4				
	Aug 2 – Aug 30, 2009	1,008	1.28	3.5				
	Feb 3 – Mar 25, 2010	1,008	1.61	3.9				
Libya	Aug 17 – Oct 19, 2009	1,000	1.59	3.9	Face-to-face	Arabic, English		Includes three areas: Tripoli, Benghazi, and Al Kufra. The areas represent roughly half of the adult population. The sample skews male and employed.
	Feb 20 – Mar 18, 2010	1,000	1.18	3.4				
Malaysia	Aug 2 – Sep 27, 2008	1,000	1.60	3.9	Face-to-face	Bahasa Malay, Chinese (2009) English		
	Jun 12 – Jul 26, 2009	1,011	2.04	4.4				
Mali	Apr 18 – Jun 5, 2008	1,000	1.53	3.8	Face-to-face	French, Bambara		

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Country	Data Collection Dates	Number of Interviews	Design Effect ^a	Margin of Error ^b	Mode of Interviewing	Languages	Over-sample ^c	Exclusions (Samples are nationally representative unless noted otherwise)
Mauritania	Jun 25 – Jul 5, 2008	1,000	1.73	4.1	Face-to-face	French, Arabic, Pulaar, Wolof (2009) Soninke		
	Feb 20 – Mar 1, 2009	1,000	1.43	3.7				
	Jul 25 – Sep 26, 2009	984	1.75	4.1				
Morocco	Feb 26 – Mar 18, 2009	1,000	1.21	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic, French		
	Aug 7 – Aug 24, 2009	1,031	1.41	3.6				
	Feb 18 – Mar 23, 2010	1,002	1.26	3.5				
Netherlands	May 26 – Jun 18, 2008	1,000	1.53	3.8	Landline Telephone	Dutch		
Niger	May 25 – Jun 14, 2008	1,000	1.23	3.4	Face-to-face	French, Zarma, Hausa		The Northern part of the country (Agadez region) was excluded, approximately 5% of the population.
	Jun 19 – Jun 28, 2009	1,000	1.29	3.5				
Nigeria	Mar 27 – Apr 22, 2008	1,000	1.77	4.1	Face-to-face	English, Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo		
	Jul 15 – Aug 6, 2009							
Norway	Jun 8 – Jun 24, 2008	1,000	1.42	3.7	Landline Telephone	Norwegian		
Pakistan	May 14 – Jun 26, 2008	804	1.48	4.2	Face-to-face	Urdu	Urban	FATA and AJK were excluded. The excluded area represents approximately 5% of the population. Note: Improved sample coverage and change in data collection agency beginning June 2009 measurement.
	Oct 11 – Oct 29, 2008	840	1.45	4.1				
	Dec 18 – Dec 30, 2008	840	1.49	4.1				
	May 1 – May 17, 2009	842	1.41	4.0				
	May 1 – Jun 30, 2009	1,133	1.57	3.7				
	Nov 14 – Dec 7, 2009	1,147	1.56	3.6				
Palestinian Territories	Aug 9 – Aug 20, 2008	1,000	1.55	3.9	Face-to-face	Arabic		The sample includes East Jerusalem.
	Feb 13 – Feb 22, 2009	1,014	1.44	3.7				
	Aug 3 – Aug 17, 2009	1,000	1.42	3.7				
	Feb 4 – Feb 20, 2010	1,000	1.50	3.8				
Qatar	Jan 2009	1,012	1.33	3.6	Face-to-face	Arabic		Includes Qataris and Arab expatriates; non-Arabs were excluded; more than 50% of the population is excluded.
	Mar 11 – Mar 25, 2009	1,016	1.44	3.7				
Saudi Arabia	Mar 7 – May 13, 2008	1,150	1.59	3.6	Face-to-face	Arabic		Includes Saudis only. Arab expatriates and non-Arabs were excluded; approximately 20% of the population is excluded.
	Feb 17 – Mar 20, 2009	1,031	1.23	3.4				
	Aug 1 – Aug 21, 2009	1,021	1.41	3.6				
Senegal	Apr 14 – Apr 23, 2008	1,000	2.14	4.5	Face-to-face	French, Wolof		The sample skews educated.
Sierra Leone	May 26 – Jun 9, 2008	1,000	1.45	3.7	Face-to-face	English, Mende, Krio, Temne		

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Country	Data Collection Dates	Number of Interviews	Design Effect ^a	Margin of Error ^b	Mode of Interviewing	Languages	Over-sample ^c	Exclusions (Samples are nationally representative unless noted otherwise)
Somaliland Region	Mar 6 – Mar 17, 2009	1,000	1.21	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic, Somali, Afar		
	Aug 1 – Aug 11, 2009	1,000	1.24	3.4				
Sudan	Mar 2 – Mar 12, 2009	1,000	1.89	4.2	Face-to-face	Arabic, English		The Darfur region was excluded, approximately 15% of the population.
	Jul 29 – Aug 9, 2009	1,000	1.74	4.1				
Syria	Jun 1 – Aug 26, 2008	1,209	2.06	4.0	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Feb 20 – Mar 16, 2009	1,082	1.29	3.4				
	Aug 10 – Sep 30, 2009	1,018	1.29	3.4				
	Mar 3 – Apr 30, 2010	1,029	1.27	3.4				
Tajikistan	Oct 3 – Nov 29, 2008	1,000	1.44	3.7	Face-to-face	Russian, Tajik, (2008) Uzbek,		
	Jul 27 – Aug 14, 2009	1,000	1.44	3.7				
Tunisia	Apr 1 – Jun 26, 2008	1,100	1.36	3.4	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Feb 20 – Mar 25, 2009	1,008	1.11	3.3				
	Aug 2 – Aug 22, 2009	1,006	1.15	3.3				
	Feb 3 – Apr 27, 2010	1,059	1.35	3.5				
Turkey	Jun 23 – Jul 16, 2008	1,004	1.26	3.5	Face-to-face	Turkish		
	Oct 24 – Nov 17, 2009	999	1.47	3.8				
Turkmenistan	Jul 1 – Aug 9, 2009	1,000	1.20	3.4	Face-to-face	Turkmen, Russian		
United Arab Emirates	Mar 1 – Mar 31, 2009	1,013	1.35	3.5	Face-to-face	Arabic		Includes Emiratis and Arab expatriates; non-Arabs were excluded, approximately more than 50% of the population.
	Aug 8 – Sep 18, 2009	1,041	1.34	3.5				
United Kingdom	Jun 4 – Jun 24, 2008	1,001	1.34	3.6	Landline Telephone	English		
	Apr 17 – May 6, 2009	1,002	1.45	3.7				
United States	Jun 24 – Aug 24, 2008	1,004	1.31	3.5	Panel (2008)	English		
	May 5 – Jul 8, 2009	1,003	1.48	3.8	Landline and Cellular Telephone (2009)			
Yemen	Feb 24 – Mar 19, 2009	1,000	1.51	3.8	Face-to-face	Arabic		
	Aug 4 – Sep 2, 2009	1,000	1.43	3.7				
	Feb 12 – Feb 27, 2010	1,000	1.57	3.9				

- a The design effect calculation reflects the weights and does not incorporate the intraclass correlation coefficients. Design effect calculation: $n^*(\text{sum of squared weights})/((\text{sum of weights})^2/(\text{sum of weights}))$
- b Margin of error is calculated based on a proportion at the 95% confidence level. The maximum margin of error was calculated assuming a reported percentage of 50% and takes into account the design effect. Margin of error calculation: $\sqrt{(0.25/N)*1.96^2*(DE)}$
- c Areas with a disproportionately high number of interviews in the sample.
- d Reasons for these differences could include household sampling, respondent sampling in the household, errors in self-reports of actual attainment, or dated population information.



